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COPYRIGHT TRUST
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky††
Collaborative production of expressive content accounts for an ever-
growing number of copyrighted works.  Indeed, in the age of content sharing
and peer production, collaborative efforts may have become the paradigmatic
form of authorship.  Surprisingly, though, copyright law continues to view
the single-author model as the dominant model of peer production.  Copy-
right law’s approach to authorship is currently based on a hodgepodge of
rigid doctrines that conflate ownership and control.  The result is a binary
system under which a contributor to a collaborative work is either recognized
as an author with full control and management rights or a person who is
deemed a nonauthor with no rights whatsoever.  We argue that the doctrines
and judicial precedents that govern the all-important issue of authorship are
out of step with authorial reality.  And the cost to the copyright system is
enormous.  As we show in this Article, the misalignment between copyright
law and authorial reality is both inefficient and unfair: it harms incentives
to create, it denies reward to contributors, it leads to underutilization of con-
tent, and it creates excessive litigation.
To remedy this state of affairs, we propose a new legal construct, which
we call “copyright trust.”  In designing this new tool we draw on insights
from property and corporate theory—two areas of research that have long
dealt with the challenges of collaborative enterprises and coownerships.  The
doctrine of copyright trust is predicated on the insight of decoupling owner-
ship from control.  Essentially, it would empower courts to appoint one con-
tributor as an “owner-trustee” with full managerial rights and the exclusive
power to control the use of the work, while recognizing all other contributors
as “owner-beneficiaries,” who would be entitled to receive a certain percentage
of the proceeds from the work.  Copyright trusts would enable courts to retain
the benefits of having a single owner without sacrificing the rightful claims
of other contributors who would be entitled to receive a just reward for their
efforts.  The proposed doctrine of copyright trust would supplement, not re-
place, current doctrine.  It is designed to enrich the menu of options available
to courts in deciding authorship issues.  The addition of our solution to the
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judicial toolbox would not only make it richer but would also infuse current
law with much-needed flexibility that is sorely missing from other authorship
doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
The sole author is an important analytical benchmark for copy-
right law and policy.1  But in the real world, many copyright assets—
and perhaps the vast majority of the commercially valuable ones—
result from the efforts of more than one contributor.  Indeed, in cer-
tain copyright domains, such as cinema, software, and games, all
works emanate from the labor of multiple individuals as a matter of
course.  Dozens contribute to the making of a computer game.  A
movie is made by hundreds, perhaps thousands.  Yet the law has, to
1 See Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 17–18 (2008); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Con-
flicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1206–07 (2000).
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date, found only imperfect formulas for allocating rights among con-
tributors, despite numerous rulings2 and contributions by theorists.3
Disputes among collaborators in creative works are legion.  Just
consider a few of the prominent recent cases involving ownership dis-
putes among contributors to copyrighted works.  In Garcia v. Google,
Inc.,4 an actress in a controversial movie about the life of Muhammad,
the founder of Islam, won a claim of separate ownership of her per-
formance, thereby blocking distribution of the movie through popu-
lar outlets like YouTube.5  In Aalmuhammed v. Lee,6 the writer of
several pieces of dialogue and scenes in Spike Lee’s biographical film
about Malcolm X saw the court reject his claim of a share of owner-
ship in the film.7  In Thomson v. Larson,8 the court rejected a dra-
maturg’s claim of joint authorship of the play “Rent” even though she
had worked face-to-face with the screenwriter in altering the story and
rewriting the script.9
2 See generally Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356 (7th
Cir. 2009) (finding a joint copyright between composer and songwriter); Richlin v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s find-
ing that plaintiffs did not have a copyright interest in the treatment rights that their ances-
tor assigned to the defendant motion picture company); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that creative contributions did not suffice to establish
coauthorship); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
the collaboration alone test for copyright interests); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d
Cir. 1991) (affirming that joint authorship requires intent by the parties to establish
coauthorship copyright interests); Maxwood Music Ltd. v. Malakian, 713 F. Supp. 2d 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that reserving the right to make final decisions does not indicate
an intent to be a joint author); Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to find copyright interest when there was no under-
standing between parties that song would be used, and thus no joint authorship).
3 Two excellent recent examples are Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthor-
ship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683 (2014) and Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, Copyright in
Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683 (2013). Other works include Benjamin E. Jaffe, Rebutting the
Equality Principle: Adapting the Co-tenancy Law Model to Enhance the Remedies Available to Joint
Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549 (2011); Susan Keller, Collaboration in Theater:
Problems and Copyright Solutions, 33 UCLA L. REV. 891 (1986); Michael Landau, Joint Works
Under United States Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation Through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54
IDEA 157 (2014); Robert P. Merges, Locke for Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collec-
tive Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179 (2008); J. David Yarbrough, Jr., Comment, What’s
Mine Might Be Yours: Why We Should Rethink the Default Rule for Copyright Co-ownership in Joint
Works, 76 TUL. L. REV. 493 (2001).
4 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
5 Adi Robertson, YouTube Must Take Down Explosive ‘Innocence of Muslims’ Video in Copy-
right Suit, VERGE (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/26/
5449826/google-youtube-must-remove-innocence-of-muslims-video-in-copyright-suit;
Eugene Volokh, Copyright Meets “Innocence of Muslims”: Ninth Circuit Orders Removal of Movie
from YouTube, on Copyright Grounds, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/26/copyright-meets-innocence-of-mus
lims-ninth-circuit-orders-removal-of-movie-from-youtube-on-copyright-grounds/.
6 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
7 See id. at 1229, 1238.
8 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
9 See id. at 205.
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Despite the frequency of disputes among collaborators, the law
has yet to produce a satisfactory formulation for allocating rights.  No
less than a half-dozen legal doctrines potentially affect the rights of
multiple contributors to copyrighted works.10  Yet, the current legal
tools have proved irremediably ill suited for tackling the intricate yet
crucially important topic of works arising from multiple contributions.
Not only do the doctrines lead to inconsistent results, they also fail to
offer legal structures that reflect the true interests of the multiple con-
tributors and the societal interest in optimizing the utilization of
works of intellectual property.11
The adverse effects of unsatisfactory resolutions of collaborators’
rights go well beyond questions of distributive justice among the liti-
gants.  How copyright law treats collaborators’ rights affects two other
crucial interests: the incentive to create and the efficiency of use.
Consider, first, incentives to create.  The law’s treatment of multi-
ple contributors greatly affects the likelihood that certain works will
be created at all.  The promises made by the law to potential contribu-
tors affect their incentives to join in the creation of future works.  Po-
tential contributors will be reluctant to take part in creating a work if
they fear that they will not receive adequate compensation.  As a re-
sult, if the law errs in its distribution of rights, works that can only be
produced with the contribution of many individuals might never be
created, to the detriment of society as a whole.
Now consider the efficiency of use.  The law’s allocation of the
rights to manage copyrighted works potentially plays a decisive role in
determining the likelihood that copyrighted works will be efficiently
exploited by society.  The number of authors recognized by law is of
vital importance to future uses of copyrighted works.  An excess of
authors with full rights to license copyrighted works would essentially
eviscerate the value of copyright by ending the monopoly protection it
gives to creators.  To take an extreme example, imagine that every one
of the tens of thousands of employees of Microsoft enjoyed the rights
of joint authors in a popular program like Microsoft Word.  A license
from any of these joint authors could give the licensee full rights in
the word processing program.  No other author could block such li-
censing deals.  The competition of the thousands of authors to sell
licenses would tend to drive the price of the work down to the margi-
nal cost of the license, i.e., zero.  On the other hand, an excess of
authors with veto rights would essentially guarantee nonuse of the
10 As we discuss infra Part I, these doctrines include such doctrines of authorship as
work-made-for-hire, joint authorship, and, for lack of a better term, authorship; doctrines
for compound works such as derivative works and compilations; and doctrines for transfer-
ring rights, such as implied license.
11 See infra Part I.
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work.  Consider again the example of Microsoft Word, but this time
imagine that each of the tens of thousands of employees had a sepa-
rate copyright interest in the few lines of code she or he contributed
and that the program could only be licensed when all contributors
agreed.  No one could license use of the program as a whole without
the consent of tens of thousands of people, some of whom might be
on vacation, and others of whom might be irrational, spiteful, or just
plain disagreeable.
Unfortunately, given the way copyright law currently treats ques-
tions of ownership, resolutions that encourage efficient use of copy-
righted works tend to undermine incentives to create.  Conversely,
judgments that best protect incentives to create copyrighted works
lower the likelihood that the works will be efficiently managed.  The
reason for this is straightforward.  Granting collaborators a share in
the rights of ownership incentivizes their participation in creating the
work.  However, it also reduces the likelihood that the work will be
well managed.  As we explore in greater detail in Part I, under current
doctrine more owners almost certainly means either dissipation of the
value of copyright or underuse of the copyrighted work.  Shutting col-
laborators out of an ownership interest preserves good management
of the copyrighted work but reduces the likelihood that potential fu-
ture collaborators will want to contribute their share to creating
works.
This Article offers a novel approach to allocating rights among
collaborators; it proposes an entirely new doctrine that recognizes a
new form of ownership in copyright assets.
Our proposal is based on two central insights.  First, the problems
copyright encounters in coupling ownership with management are
not unique to the law of copyright.  Other fields of law—most notably
property law—have encountered similar dilemmas,12 and resolved
them by decoupling ownership and management.13  As we will show,
the doctrines used in other fields of law can be adapted to copyright.14
Second, long before questions about collaboration took center
stage in copyright law, the field of property confronted and analyzed
the question of how allocating and dividing property rights affects the
management of assets.15  Several property theorists have shown how
excessive divisions of property rights can create an “anticommons”
12 See Merges, supra note 3, at 1187 (noting that the challenge of multiple right- R
sholders exists in many legal areas, including intellectual property, and that one solution is
to construct “a single focal point entity to represent the larger group”).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 See infra Part II.A.1.
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that paralyzes the use of assets.16  Others have shown how denying
individuals the right to veto uses of an asset—essentially permitting
almost anyone to use the asset without penalty—can create a “com-
mons” that leads to excessive exploitation of the asset.17  We show that
property analyses of commons and anticommons can be applied to
copyright (with some adaptation), and that they can point the way to
solutions that improve management of copyright assets.
Drawing on the laws of property and copyright, we propose a
form of “copyright trust” that concentrates the power of management
in a single individual while diffusing the benefits of ownership among
many contributors.  This decoupling of ownership and management,
we show, overcomes the dilemma posed by the competition between
the incentives to create and the efficiency of use.  We show that when
our proposed copyright trusts are in place, collaborators are still in-
centivized to contribute to creating works because they are guaran-
teed a fair share of the profits.  At the same time, our proposed
copyright trusts streamline management of copyrighted works by
keeping control of the work in the hands of a single person, ensuring
that the copyrighted work will be used efficiently.  Thus, our proposed
doctrine promotes the competing goals of reducing disputes among
contributors, encouraging the collaborative creation of works and in-
centivizing the optimal management of existing works.18
To illustrate how our new doctrine would work in practice, con-
sider how it might affect the outcome of two recent authorship
disputes.
In Aalmuhammed v. Lee,19 Jefri Aalmuhammed, who had written
several pieces of dialogue and scenes in Spike Lee’s biographical film
about Malcolm X, claimed a share of the film as a joint author.20  The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s claims of copy-
right on the grounds that Aalmuhammed was neither a joint author of
the entire film, nor the author of the scenes he wrote.21  Thus, the
Aalmuhammed court protected efficiency of use at the expense of the
incentive to create; it ensured the studio could manage the film with-
16 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 2 (2008); Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621, 677 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons]; Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, in
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1982).
17 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
18 See infra Part II.C.
19 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
20 Id. at 1229–30.
21 Id. at 1236.
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out interference, but it disincentived future contributions to film like
Aalmuhammed’s.  Our proposed doctrine would have allowed the
court to protect efficiency of future uses of the film while still incen-
tivizing future screenwriters by guaranteeing remuneration.  Specifi-
cally, the court could have made the movie studio an “owner-trustee”
with all the rights and powers of control, while recognizing
Aalmhuammed as an “owner-beneficiary” with a right to receive com-
pensation from the proceeds of the movie.
In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,22 by contrast, Jonathan Tasini, a
freelance author, claimed separate ownership in an article he had
contributed to the New York Times.23  The Supreme Court ruled that
Tasini retained ownership of his article and the Times’s license to print
the article in its daily newspaper did not allow it to include the article
in an electronic database.24  Thus, the Court chose to protect incen-
tives to create at the expense of the efficient use of the work.  The
majority elected to honor the rights of the freelance journalists even
though the decision ran the risk that the digital editions of the New
York Times would be offered sans the contributions of the freelance
journalists.  Under our solution, the Court would have been spared
the “Solomonic choice.”  It could have declared the New York Times
owner-trustee with full managerial prerogatives over the content of
the newspaper while bestowing on the freelance journalists the status
of owner-beneficiaries who have an entitlement to a certain prorated
percentage of the royalties the New York Times received in exchange
for its decision to license content to computerized databases.
It should be emphasized that the proposed doctrine of “copyright
trust” is intended to supplement, not replace, current doctrine.  It is
designed to enrich the menu of options available to courts in deciding
authorship issues.  The addition of our solution to the judicial toolbox
would not only make it richer, however; it would infuse current law
with much needed flexibility that is sorely missing from other author-
ship doctrines.  We are therefore confident that our proposal can dra-
matically improve the management of copyright disputes among
collaborators.
Structurally, our Article unfolds divided into three parts.  Part I
lays out the intricacies of current doctrines concerning multiple con-
tributions to copyrighted works.  In it, we discuss the various methods
by which lawmakers and courts have sought to deal with the challenge
presented by works comprised of multiple contributions.  We show
that the doctrinal tools provided by extant copyright law are ill suited
for the task assigned to them and that consequently our law falls short
22 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
23 See id. at 488, 491.
24 See id. at 506.
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of promoting the goals that underlie our copyright system.  In Part II,
we offer our proposed doctrinal solution.  We explain how existing
organizational tools in the world of property, as well as corporate law,
can be imported into copyright law in order to better achieve the nor-
mative goals of copyright regarding collaborative works.  Additionally,
we provide examples of how our proposal could be used to resolve
many of the shortcomings of current law. Finally, in Part III, we ad-
dress potential objections to our proposal, both practical and
theoretical.
I
DOCTRINE
Collaborative production of expressive works plays an ever-in-
creasing role in the domain of copyright law.25  If in the past, collabo-
rative production characterized limited categories of expressive works,
such as movies and software, in the present, collaborative production
has permeated many creative sectors that were traditionally bastions of
sole authorship thanks to the availability of new technology that facili-
tates cooperation among creators.26  Many literary works, pictorial
works, and games, especially in digital media, owe their origin to the
labors of more than one creator.27  One might have thought that cen-
turies after its birth, copyright law would be well equipped to handle
the challenge of collaborative works, but the truth is disappointing.
The law is a hodgepodge of intricate and inconsistent doctrines that
provides, at best, very partial and tenuous solutions to the challenge of
collaborative authorship.
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
We begin by examining the explicit statutory tools for dealing
with collaborations.  The Copyright Act directly addresses issues con-
cerning collaboration in copyrighted works in several places.  Unfor-
tunately, as we shall see, the different legislative schemes do not add
up to a uniform or comprehensive approach.
25 F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint?  Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under
U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 230–31 (2001); Paulette S. Fox, Note, Preserving
the Collaborative Spirit of American Theater: The Need for a “Joint Authorship Default Rule” in Light
of the Rent Decision’s Unanswered Question, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 497, 498–500
(2001).
26 See Fox, supra note 25, at 498–99. R
27 See Mark Cooper, From Wifi to Wikis and Open Source: The Political Economy of Collabora-
tive Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 126–27
(2006); Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1487, 1488–89 (1997).
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1. Ownership
The most important statutory tool for handling collaboration is
ownership.  The basic rules of ownership of copyrighted works are
found in section 201 of the Act.28  The basic rule for noncollaborative
works is simple: the author owns copyright in works she creates.29  Un-
fortunately, the simplicity ends there.  The Copyright Act creates no
less than three different (and not entirely consistent) doctrines for
dealing with collaborative works.30
a. Work Made for Hire
The “work-made-for-hire” doctrine allocates ownership of copy-
righted works made by an employee to an employer.31  When this doc-
trine fully applies to all contributions to a work, only the employer
owns a copyright in the result.32  The doctrine might appear to lend
needed clarity to nearly all questions regarding ownership where a
corporation or other organization is involved.  Unfortunately, it does
not.  The doctrine fails to resolve many important questions regarding
copyrighted works even when produced within a corporate
environment.
The work-made-for-hire doctrine is frightfully complicated.  To
begin with, the doctrine requires a specific employer-employee rela-
tionship within the bounds of agency law.33  This means, for example,
that where a programming company outsources writing of a particular
module to an outside contractor, the work-made-for-hire doctrine
does not apply.34  Additionally, even for regular employees, the doc-
trine only applies to work done within the “scope of [an employee’s]
employment.”35  Thus, for example, in the case of Roeslin III v. District
of Columbia, the court denied work-made-for-hire status to a computer
program for handling survey data written by a labor economist whose
duties included collecting and evaluating the data.36  The court rea-
soned that programming was outside the scope of the economist’s em-
ployment.37  Similarly, in Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, a case involving a
dispute over the rights in a computer program pertaining to satellite
28 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
29 See id. § 201(a).
30 See id. § 201(a)–(c).
31 Id. § 201(b).
32 See id.; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1724. R
33 See Cmty. for Creative Non-violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–41 (1989); Casey &
Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1724–25. R
34 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
35 Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994).
36 921 F. Supp. 793, 797–98 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 228 (1958)).
37 See id.
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orbits, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even though the
defendant was an employee of the plaintiff and the program came
within the type of work he was hired to perform, it was not a work
made for hire since it was written outside the time and space limita-
tions of the employment and the employee was not “motivated by a
desire to further [Avtec’s] corporate goals.”38
The law permits clarifications of work-made-for-hire status by spe-
cial agreement,39 but this, too, can only be done within certain
bounds.  For instance, while an agreement may extend
work-made-for-hire status to work done by an independent contractor,
the law will only recognize the validity of such agreements if the work
is of a specified kind, such as a part of a motion picture, or a transla-
tion.40  Section 101 of the Copyright Act gives a list of ten kinds of
works for which the law will recognize the validity of agreements to
grant work-made-for-hire status to “specially ordered or commis-
sioned” works.41  The list of ten works ranges from the specific, such
as an “instructional text,” to the general, such as a “compilation.”42
Adding to the confusion, some of the listed types of works are defined
by the Copyright Act (e.g., “compilation”), while others are not (e.g.,
“answer material for a test”).43  Worse yet, some of the terms are de-
fined for the entire Copyright Act, while others are defined only for
purposes of work-made-for-hire.44
Needless to say, the doctrine leaves many disputes regarding col-
laborative works without clear answers.  Even if a work is commis-
sioned in advance by a corporation, and the corporation’s
management signs work-made-for-hire agreements with everyone who
labors in producing the work, the work-made-for-hire doctrine may
still fail to guarantee the corporation’s ownership of the resulting
rights in the copyrighted work.45  At the same time, the
work-made-for-hire doctrine may capture the rights resulting from an
artist’s creative output and reassign them to the artist’s employer,
even though neither artist nor employer contemplated that result.46
It should be noted that where the work-made-for-hire doctrine
does apply, the results are drastic.  The employee enjoys no rights
38 21 F.3d at 572.
39 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“work made for hire” includes a commissioned work in
certain situations where there is an express written agreement providing so).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id.
44 For example, “supplementary works” and “instructional texts” are defined specifi-
cally for the purpose of the work-made-for-hire scenario, but other terms such as “collective
works” and “motion pictures” are terms defined with respect to all copyrighted works. Id.
45 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. R
46 See Dougherty, supra note 25, at 239. R
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whatsoever in the resulting work; all rights belong to the employer.47
The rights denied to the employee include even some items that
would belong to an author that had voluntarily sold all copyright to
the employer.  For instance, an ordinary author may terminate a trans-
fer of copyright after the fact, even if the contract had specified other-
wise.48  (The Copyright Act specifies that such terminations can only
be done within a certain time period, several decades after the trans-
fer.)49  However, an employee has no right to terminate the transfer
of rights to an employer.50
b. Joint Authorship
Where the work-made-for-hire doctrine aims to simplify rights by
concentrating ownership in a single person or entity (the employer),
the joint authorship doctrine aims to achieve equity by splitting rights
among all joint authors.
According to the Copyright Act, the “authors of a joint work are
coowners of copyright in the work.”51  The Copyright Act defines a
joint work as one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole.”52
While the law defines the contributors’ intentions as the key fea-
ture in identifying joint works, courts have often sought to avoid the
difficult questions concerning the parties’ mental states by searching
for other potential limitations on joint authorship.  Thus, for exam-
ple, several cases would deny contributors to a work the status of joint
author on the grounds that the contributions, when considered sepa-
rately, would not themselves have constituted a copyrighted work.53
Ultimately, however, questions of intent are unavoidable.  Thus, for
example, in Childress v. Taylor, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the status of a joint work to a play written by Alice Childress.54
The court acknowledged that Childress had written the play at the
suggestion and with the considerable assistance of Clarice Taylor.55
47 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
48 See id. § 203.
49 See id.
50 See id. § 203(a).
51 Id. § 201(a).
52 Id. § 101.
53 Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 114–15 (2d Cir.
2002); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071–73 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500,
506–07 (2d Cir. 1991); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990);
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990); S.O.S.,
Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 1989).
54 Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.
55 See id.
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However, the court ruled that only Taylor, but not Childress, had in-
tended for the two to share the status of “joint authors.”56  Nonethe-
less, courts have favored objective criteria for determining intent.57
For instance, in adjudicating Jefri Aalmuhammed’s claim of joint au-
thorship of the film Malcolm X in Aalmuhammed v. Lee,58 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals offered a variety of indicators for determin-
ing contributors’ intent, including manifestations of joint authorship
such as a cowriting credit.59
As scholars have noted, many aspects of joint authorship remain
controversial and unclear.60  Indeed, even items that are generally
thought to be clear are quite hazy upon closer review.  For instance, it
is generally agreed that collaborators may resolve many issues related
to their rights if they voluntarily agree on joint authorship.61  How-
ever, there are surprisingly few cases on the subject.  The case author-
ity, such as it is, tells a more complex story.62  Advance agreement can
establish the existence of a joint authorship.63  However, if the agree-
ment varies the terms of the joint authorship, for example by varying
the percentage ownership from the default 50%-50% to a 90%-10%
split that better reflects the parties’ actual contributions, the courts
will view the relevant parts of the agreement as a transfer of owner-
ship, and thus subject to all the rules of transfer, rather than an intrin-
sic part of the joint ownership.64
More broadly, the law has little to say about the meaning of joint
authorship for the joint authors.  The law suffices with the laconic in-
struction that “[t]he authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright
in the work.”65  The omission of more specific instruction is appar-
ently deliberate.  As the house report for the 1976 Copyright Act tells
us,
[t]here is . . . no need for a specific statutory provision concerning
the rights and duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on
56 Id.
57 See Balganesh, supra note 3, at 1737. R
58 202 F.3d 1227.
59 Id. at 1234.
60 See Balganesh, supra note 3; George W. Hutchinson, Can the Federal Courts Save Rock R
Music?: Why a Default Joint Authorship Rule Should Be Adopted to Protect Co-authors Under United
States Copyright Law, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 77, 81–89 (2003); Steven S. Kan, Court
Standards on Joint Inventorship & Authorship, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 267,
297–300 (2009); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserv-
ing the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 213–20 (2001); Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Origi-
nality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK L. REV. 123, 125–34 (2002).
61 Childress, 945 F.2d at 507; see 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:7 (2014).
62 See VerSteeg, supra note 60, at 151–58. R
63 Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
64 See Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Keller, supra note 3, at 912–14. R
65 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
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this point is left undisturbed.  Under the bill, as under the present
law, coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants
in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use
of license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the
other coowners for any profits.66
Thus, joint authorship is an incomplete remedy for the dilemmas
of contributors for several reasons.  First of all, contributors may not
have the presence of mind to reach agreement in advance of their
work or to record sufficient evidence of their work to prove that they
have an agreement.  In many cases, negotiations are costly, and it is
only after the fact that revenues prove sufficient to have invested in
contracting.  Of course, after the fact is too late; joint authorship de-
pends on the principals’ intent during creation of the work, not
afterward.
Second, even if the parties reach an agreement in advance, the
nature of joint authorship is partially fixed by law, meaning that even
if the joint authors agree in advance to divide their rights, only certain
divisions are possible.  The historic approach to joint authorship dic-
tates that joint authors have undivided rights in the whole of owner-
ship (like tenants in common).67  Joint authors may agree to vary their
respective shares (for instance, two joint authors may agree in advance
that they will split their ownership 90%-10%)68 or to deny themselves
one or more of the exclusive rights that would otherwise inhere in
copyright ownership (for example, authors may deny themselves the
right to make derivative works without one another’s consent),69 but
such agreements will likely be viewed as transfers of ownership.  Ap-
parently this means, inter alia, that some aspects of the agreement are
subject to termination.  In addition, authors may not deny one an-
other the right to convey nonexclusive licenses because such licenses
do not diminish the value of the copyrighted work.70  Conversely, only
by acting in concert can joint authors grant an exclusive license.71
Likewise, even where owners have different percentages of ownership,
they are still viewed as tenants in common with all the attendant rights
of coownership.72
Third, joint authorship often gives too much to junior contribu-
tors.  The default rules of joint authorship give each joint author an
66 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976).
67 See Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
68 See Papa’s-June Music, 921 F. Supp. at 1158.
69 See id.
70 See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2007).
71 See id. at 101.  The rules of licensing naturally imply one another.  Unless all the
authors agree, any remaining joint author can convey a nonexclusive license without the
consent of the remaining authors.  Thus, a license can only be exclusive if all joint authors
act together.
72 See Yarbrough, Jr., supra note 3, at 496. R
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equal share of the rights in the work, including the rights to
reproduce, display, perform, adapt and distribute, as well as the
all-important rights to issue nonexclusive licenses and veto the convey-
ance of exclusive licenses.73  This is a formidable package to give each
and every junior collaborator.  It would obviously be quite problem-
atic for every one of the hundreds of contributors to a film or a com-
puter program to enjoy each of these rights.  Stated otherwise, joint
authorship—at least in the default form employed today—is not a re-
alistic legal form for copyrighted works with many contributors.  As we
discuss infra, the result would certainly be the intellectual property
equivalent of a commons, which property theory shows leads to exces-
sive exploitation of the asset.74  With each of the many contributors
able to sell a license to the work, the price of using the work would
decline toward zero, and all profit would be dissipated.75
c. Collective Work
The law of collective works and compilations adds yet a further
complication to the doctrinal puzzle.
To understand why, it is important to draw attention to a peculiar
but important feature of copyright law.  Copyright law does not just
protect discrete works, like books.  It also protects component parts of
works, like chapters or paragraphs within books.76  It also protects
hard-to-define component aspects like plot lines,77 characters,78 or
even the “look and feel” of works.79  Of course, at some point, the
components are no longer protected.  One cannot copyright a com-
mon single word, for example, even if it plays an extremely important
role in a novel (like “clues” or “detective”).80
Just as we can disaggregate works into many component parts—
some copyrighted, some not—items can be aggregated to make copy-
righted works.  A collection of uncopyrightable numbers can never-
theless together become a copyrighted database due to the original
arrangement and selection of the numbers.81  More importantly for
73 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
74 See Floris Kreiken & David Koepsell, Coase and Copyright, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 1, 10–12 (2013); infra Part II.A.1.
75 Kreiken & Koepsell, supra note 74, at 10–12: Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual R
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1037–38 (2005).
76 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985).
77 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1362–63 (9th Cir. 1990); Shipman v. R.K.O. Ra-
dio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536–37 (2d Cir. 1938).
78 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:164 (2014).
79 Jack Russo & Jamie Nafziger, Software “Look and Feel” Protection in the 1990s, 15 HAS-
TINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 571, 572 (1993).
80 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 78, § 4.2. R
81 Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 515 (2d
Cir. 1991).
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our purposes, a copyrighted work may be an aggregation of copy-
righted components.  For instance, in copyright law, it is possible for
there to be 100 copyrights to each of 100 pieces of art on 100 jigsaw
pieces and an entirely different copyright for the completed jigsaw
puzzle.  In copyright terminology, a work that is an aggregation of
components is called a “compilation.”82  If the components of the
compilation are themselves copyrighted works (like our hypothetical
jigsaw puzzle), the compilation is called a “collective work.”83
Copyright law does not automatically allocate all the ownership
interests in collective works to a single person.  It is possible for 100
different people to own each of the 100 copyrights in the jigsaw piece
art, and for a 101st person to own the copyright in the jigsaw puzzle as
a whole.  The copyright in the work as a whole is distinct and lim-
ited.84  In the words of the Copyright Act, the copyright in a compila-
tion “extends only to the material contributed by the author of such
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.”85
It should be evident why this feature of the law carries the poten-
tial for dividing up ownership rights in a way that would render works
unusable.  As property theory shows, excessive fragmentation of own-
ership rights in an asset leads to an “anticommons” in which the asset
is underutilized.86  In an extreme case, the copyright in the collective
work might end up being worthless because any exercise of rights re-
garding the collective work as a whole would necessarily involve poten-
tially forbidden actions toward the component parts.
The law partially resolves this problem by granting a statutory de-
fault license for the owner of the collective work regarding the com-
ponent works.  Under the law, “the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have . . . the privilege of reproducing
and distributing [any component] contribution [but only] as part of
that . . . collective work, [or a] revision of that collective work, [or a]
later collective work in the same series.”87  This statutory license is ex-
tremely narrow.  In New York Times Co. v. Tasini, the Supreme Court
illustrated just how narrow the license is by ruling that the New York
Times could not use its “collective work” copyright in its own
newspaper to publish a database of all of its earlier published articles88
because the Times did not own the separate copyrights in articles
82 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
83 Id.
84 See id. § 103(b).
85 Id.
86 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.1. R
87 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
88 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001).
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written by freelance journalists89 and the database was not a “revision”
of the published newspapers.90
Thus, the danger that collective works will be underutilized be-
cause they fall into the dynamics of anticommons is a real one.  And
collective works are ubiquitous in copyright.  Although the Copyright
Act refers to law review (and other periodical) issues, anthologies, and
encyclopedias as examples of collective works,91 many more works—
such as collaboratively produced films, computer programs, and
murals—are potentially collective works under the definition of the
act.  Indeed, every time a work results from multiple contributions
that are not otherwise covered by the work-made-for-hire and joint
authorship doctrines, the work is prima facie a collective work, cov-
ered by many copyrights, with only a limited copyright for the
organizer.92
If this weren’t enough, the law adds a further complication with
the category of “derivative works.”  A copyrighted work that contains
parts of an earlier work is a derivative work, according to the Copy-
right Act.93  A compilation may be a derivative work, but a derivative
work need not be a compilation.94  The statutory definition of deriva-
tive works is extremely broad, encompassing all works “based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrange-
ment, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”95  The
statute adds that a “work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship” is also a derivative work.96
For the most part, the rules of compilations and derivative works
are identical as far as collaborators are concerned.  Whether we call
the subsequent work a derivative work or a compilation, it has a copy-
right that is separate from the component or base parts that covers
only the new contributions.  Yet, there are some interesting distinc-
tions between the statutory treatments of derivative works and compi-
lations (and other collective works).  For instance, as we have seen,
the statute grants the author of a collective work a limited license re-
garding contributions;97 the statute does not expressly create any simi-
89 Id. at 493–94.
90 Id. at 504.
91 17 U.S.C. § 101.
92 See id. §§ 101, 106A.
93 Id. § 101.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. § 201(c).
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lar license for the authors of derivative works.98  At the same time, the
statute does create several narrow but special rights for owners of de-
rivative works.99
These slight differences in treatment of derivative works, collec-
tive works, and compilations, have the potential to create unnecessary
confusion.
d. Combining the Tools
It should be clear that the aforementioned ownership doctrines
are not airtight categories.  Owners—and courts—can mix and match.
A single work can be a joint work with joint authors, one or more of
whom may be an employer who owns others’ work by virtue of the
work-made-for-hire doctrine, while the single work is also a part of a
larger collective work.  Thus, when a court arrives at the decision that
one of the doctrines applies to ownership of a given work, it cannot
rest easy.  Another doctrine or two may also apply.  Worse, courts will
have to figure out how the doctrines interact with one another.
As well, courts are acutely aware of the problems presented by
each of the doctrines.  This can, and does, affect their readiness to
apply them to given cases.  Consider, for example, the case of Thomson
v. Larson.100  Plaintiff Lynn Thomson had claimed the right of joint
authorship together with Jonathan Larson in a new version of the
Broadway musical Rent.101  Larson was the playwright and Thomson a
“dramaturg” hired by Larson to help “clarify[ ] the storyline of the
musical” by working face-to-face with Larson in changing the script.102
The court rejected Thomson’s claim of joint authorship on the
grounds that “Mr. Larson never regarded himself as a joint author
with Ms. Thomson,”103 but then observed that this still left open the
question of whether Thomson “automatically retain[ed] exclusive
copyright interests in the material she contributed to the [collective]
work.”104  The court confessed that this presented the court with
“somewhat of a conundrum.”105  The court acknowledged a genuine
legal difficulty in determining whether “a person who makes
a . . . copyrightable contribution but cannot meet the mutual intent
98 See id. § 201.
99 Id. § 104A(d)(3) (reliance placed on restored works for creating derivative works,
protected against infringement action); id. § 203(b)(1) (termination of license shall not
affect derivative works created prior to such termination); id. § 304(a)(4)(A) (derivative
works unaffected if application for renewal or extension of copyright in the original work
not made within one year before the expiration of copyright).
100 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
101 Id. at 198.
102 Id. at 197.
103 Id. at 202 n.20, 205.
104 Id. at 196.
105 Id. at 205.
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requirement of coauthorship, retains, in the absence of a
work-for-hire agreement or of any explicit contractual assignment of
the copyright, any rights and interests in his or her own contribu-
tion.”106  The court admitted as well its great reluctance in awarding
Thomson “rights which she never imagined, much less sought, and
which she would be loathe to enforce,” and it therefore dismissed the
potential claim on procedural grounds while refusing to express any
opinion on its merits.107
Thomson, sadly, is not atypical in demonstrating the problems
posed by the interacting doctrines as currently understood.  The logic
of the statute seems inexorably to lead to anticommons or commons
problems.  Courts naturally use procedural or other escape routes to
try to avoid the anticipated problems.
2. Transfer
Before moving from the statutory tools for dealing with collabora-
tors to judicially-created tools, it is important to take account of one
final statutory doctrine.
The initial allocation of rights according to the statute is not nec-
essarily the final allocation.  Authors are the initial owners of copy-
rights, but, for the most part, the statute permits the author to transfer
the rights to a new owner.108  Section 201(d) permits free transfer of
copyright rights and portions thereof by means of inter vivos transfers
or inheritance.109  If the transfer of a right is exclusive, the transferee
becomes an “owner” entitled to enforce the right in question.110  On
its face, the possibility of contracting can solve disputes among collab-
orators in a creative work.  Upon closer examination, however, it be-
comes clear that transfers of rights are not a panacea.  Transfers have
both practical and legal limitations.
From a practical standpoint, there is a big gap between the ability
of the relevant parties to execute transfers ex ante, before a work is
created, and ex post, after it came into being.  Ex ante, the respective
bargaining positions of the parties are determined predominantly by
their expected contribution to the work product and by the availabil-
ity of alternatives.  Ex post, the bargaining powers of the parties are
determined mostly by the law.  If the law vests in a certain party a
copyright in the work product, she gets the power to use the work and
license it to others (subject to other rightsholders’ ability to do the
same) irrespective of the magnitude of her contribution.  A party who
106 Id. at 206.
107 Id.
108 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012).
109 Id.
110 Id. § 201(d)(2).
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contributed very little to the final product, barely enough to receive a
copyright, can demand an amount far in excess of her creative contri-
bution in exchange for agreeing to transfer her rights in the work.
Such demands, whether strategic or not, are likely to be perceived as
extortionary by the other contributors and are certainly likely to in-
crease transaction costs.  As Robert Cooter famously pointed out,
many contractual negotiations fail for distributional reasons—namely,
the inability of the parties to divide the contractual surplus between
them.111  Ex post negotiations among contributors to copyrighted
content provide a prime example of this dynamic.  For this reason,
many legal doctrines adopt an entirely different approach to ques-
tions that arise ex post from those that arise ex ante.112
From a legal standpoint, transfers do not provide a fool-proof so-
lution because the law limits authors’ rights of transfer.  In earlier ver-
sions of the Copyright Act, copyright protection was divided
temporally into two terms, and, in many cases, authors could not
transfer in advance their rights to the second term.113  Several high-
profile cases, such as Stewart v. Abend,114 highlighted how this limita-
tion on transfers can tie up copyrighted works and make exploitation
more costly and difficult. Stewart concerned the copyright in a short
story published in 1942, on which the famous 1954 Alfred Hitchcock
film Rear Window was based.115  The copyright in the short story was
set to expire in 2037; however, the initial term of protection expired
in 1970.116  Since it is a derivative work, the film Rear Window cannot
legally be used without a valid license to the short story on which it is
based.117  In Stewart, Sheldon Abend, who had succeeded to the copy-
right in the short story, successfully blocked broadcast of Rear Window
on television on the theory that the movie studio’s license had expired
at the end of the initial term, requiring the studio to purchase a new
license for any post-1970 use of the film.118
111 Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 28 (1982).
112 These include doctrines such as mistaken improver doctrines, the doctrine of ne-
cessity, and the doctrine of accretion.
113 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 215 (1990).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 211–12.
116 See id. at 212.
117 Id. at 223.
118 Interestingly, after the litigation, Abend sold a license to the studio.  Joy Newborg,
Is Universal Regretting Disturbia?, DUETS BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.duetsblog.com/
2010/11/articles/idea-protection/is-universal-regretting-disturbia/.  But Abend’s succes-
sor, the Stuart Abend Revocable Trust, found itself back in court recently when it sued the
makers of the 2007 film Disturbia, described by one critic as “a limp teenage by-the-num-
bers version of Rear Window.”  Eriq Gardner, Exclusive: Decades-Old Legal Battle Over ‘Rear
Window’ Is Back On, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 29, 2010, 10:25 AM), http://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/thr-esq/exclusive-decades-old-legal-battle-33649.
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Transfers made after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act
are subject to the termination provisions in the Act.119  In an attempt
to give authors a second bite of the apple, Congress empowered own-
ers of the initial copyright to terminate transfers they executed in a
five-year period beginning in the thirty-fifth year after the execution
of the transfer and ending in the fortieth year after its execution.120
The termination rights established by Congress have proven to be of
great value to contributors to collaborative works that remained valua-
ble thirty-five years after their creation.  Not surprisingly, creators
started filing lawsuits to regain the rights in their valuable creations; in
turn, this has led to a spate of new litigation.  In one celebrated case,
Victor Willis, the lead singer of the Village People, successfully exer-
cised the termination right to regain the copyrights in the Village Peo-
ple’s successful songs.121  In another case, the estate of the animator
Jack Kirby sought to take advantage of the termination right to recap-
ture the copyrights to many of the works in the repertoire of Marvel
Comics (that have since been acquired by Disney).122  In this case,
however, the court determined that Kirby was an employee of Marvel
Comics, whose expressive output was a work made for hire.123  As of
April 2013, 534 termination notices have been filed with the copyright
office,124 including notices by the heirs of Jerry Siegel and Joseph
Shuster (the creators of Superman),125 the Eagles126 and the children
of the late Ray Charles.127
Additionally, the Copyright Act creates a limited set of “moral
rights” that cannot be transferred at all.128  The moral rights, which
apply only to works of visual art, are granted to the author, and can be
waived but not sold.129  These moral rights include the rights of attri-
bution (the right to have one’s authorship properly attributed)130 and
119 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2012).
120 Id. § 203(a)(3).
121 Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11-cv-1557 (BTM), 2012 WL 1598043 (S.D. Cal.
May 7, 2012).
122 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013).
123 Id. at 143.
124 See Ted Johnson, Legal Landmark: Artists Start to Reclaim Rights to Their Music, VARIETY
(Apr. 16, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://variety.com/2013/biz/features/artists-reclaim-rights-to-
music-1200334132/.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Dori Ann Hanswirth, “I’ll Be Back”: Termination Rights Under Section 203 of the Copy-
right Act, INTELL. PROP. MAG. (2012), available at http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/Publica
tion/e83ef548-c381-47ec-beaf-55427153237e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6143
4785-e4e8-4757-8b0a-58b0b20a8914/Termination%20Rights.pdf.
128 Laura Lee Van Velzen, Injecting a Dose of Duty into the Doctrines of Droit Moral, 74
IOWA L. REV. 629, 630 (1989).
129 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012).
130 Id. § 106A(a)(1).
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integrity (the right to protect the work from “distortion”).131  Curi-
ously, these moral rights do not apply at all in the case of works made
for hire.132  The result is that for a certain class of works, subsequent
agreements are unable to resolve certain kinds of disputes among
collaborators.
B. Judicial Doctrines
Given the inadequacy of the statutory tools for resolving disputes
about collaboration in the creation of copyrighted works, it is unsur-
prising that courts have taken to fashioning judge-made law in order
to resolve the cases.  Two legal concepts, in particular, have played an
important role: judicial interpretations of the concept of authorship
and implied license.
1. Authorship
Judicial interpretations of authorship as a method of resolving
disputes about collaborations are perhaps best seen in the case of Aal-
muhammed.133  The Aalmuhammed case, as we noted above, involved
scenes and dialogue penned by Aalmuhammed for inclusion in a
Spike Lee-directed biographic film of Malcolm X.134  In the absence
of writing showing a work-made-for-hire relationship or a transfer of
rights by Aalmuhammed, the two statutory tools left to the court in
vindicating Aalmuhammed’s claims were the doctrines of joint author-
ship and collective works.135  Neither option was particularly attractive
to the court.  Finding Aalmuhammed to be a joint author would have
given Aalmuhammed a share in decision-making power, including,
most importantly, the right to grant licenses; finding Aalmuhammed
to be the author of a separate work incorporated within the larger
collective work of the film would have given Aalmuhammed veto
power over most future uses of the work.136  In any event, the court
chose an entirely different way of disposing of the case.
Acknowledging that some of the facts favored an interpretation
of Aalmuhammed as a joint author (such as the copyrightability of
Aalmuhammed’s contribution and the clear joint intent that
Aalmuhammed’s work would become a part of the larger whole), the
131 Id. § 106A(a)(3).
132 Id. § 101 (definition of a “work of visual art” expressly excludes works made for
hire).
133 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
134 Id. at 1229–30.
135 See supra Part I.A.1(listing and discussing these three different statutory tools for
dealing with collaborations).
136 Interestingly, while the opinion considers at length the possibility of joint author-
ship, it does not mention that the film might be a collective work.  The reason for the
omission is not clear.
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court ruled that Aalmuhammed could not claim rights because he was
not an author at all.137  Reaching beyond the statute, the court ruled
“that authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copy-
rightable contribution.”138  According to the court, “as the number of
contributors grows and the work itself becomes less the product of
one or two individuals who create it without much help, the word [au-
thorship] is harder to apply.”139  Turning back to a nineteenth-cen-
tury Supreme Court decision,140 the court ruled that an author is the
“master mind,” or “the person to whom the work owes its origin and
who superintended the whole work.”141  Thus, ruled the court, even if
everything else about Aalmuhammed’s work appeared to enjoy the
statutory protection of the Copyright Act, Aalmuhammed could claim
no rights in the work, since he was not its author.142
Aalmuhammed is far from the only case to employ the strategy of
denying rights on the grounds of lack of authorship.  For instance, in
Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic,143 a court in
the Southern District of New York upheld the rights of Alexander
Lindsay, the director of a documentary film about salvaging the Ti-
tanic, against the claims of the actual photographers to the copy-
righted footage of the salvage operation.144  The court acknowledged
that only the actual photographers were on the scene; Lindsay sat in a
ship safely away from the wreck.145  However, said the court, Lindsay
“exercised such a high degree of control over a film operation—in-
cluding the type and amount of lighting used, the specific camera an-
gles to be employed, and other detail-intensive artistic elements of a
film—such that the final product duplicates his conceptions and vi-
sions of what the film should look like,” and therefore he, and he
alone was the “author.”146
These cases illustrate a judicial doctrine of authorship that poten-
tially denies many contributors to a copyrighted work any share in the
resulting rights.  The doctrine denies rights as an author to anyone
but the “auteur” or “master mind,” reserving for that one person all
the rights of those working under him or her, even in the absence of a
work-made-for-fire relationship.  The doctrine is thus potentially
137 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1236.
138 Id. at 1232.
139 Id.
140 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
141 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233.
142 Id. at 1231.
143 No. 97-cv-9248 (HB), 1999 WL 816163 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
144 Id. at *7.
145 Id. at *5.
146 Id.
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extremely harsh in its results, denying any legal rights whatsoever even
to very significant contributors like Aalmuhammed.
Perhaps due to the harshness of the result, the “master mind”
theory of authorship is not universally accepted.  In Garcia v. Google,
Inc., for example, the court rejected the applicability of the doctrine
in determining whether Cindy Lee Garcia, an actress, could claim
rights in her performance in the controversial film Innocence of Mus-
lims.147  Garcia had an extremely small role in the film, and her dia-
logue was redubbed in the final film.148  Indeed, she objected to the
inclusion of her performance in the film on the grounds that she was
led to believe that she was acting for a different film themed on a
desert adventure.149  There can be little question that Garcia was not
the “master mind” of the film.  However, the court linked the author-
ship doctrine exclusively to the question of joint authorship, sug-
gesting that where a contributor claimed ownership of a separate
component within the larger work, the contributor need not be a
master mind at all.150  The dissent correctly observed that this inter-
pretation was a novel reinterpretation of the judicial doctrine of
authorship.151
2. Implied License
An entirely different judicial doctrine for dealing with problems
of collaboration utilizes the concept of transfer, rather than author-
ship.152  The strategy behind the judicial doctrine is to recognize sepa-
rate copyrights in the separate contributions, but then find that the
collaborators have granted permission (in the form of an implied li-
cense) to use their separately copyrighted contribution.153
To understand the way courts use implied licenses, it is valuable
to look at the way the Copyright Act treats licenses more generally.
Licenses under the Copyright Act come in two varieties: exclusive and
nonexclusive.  Exclusive licenses must be executed in a written instru-
ment signed by the grantor.154  Nonexclusive licenses, by contrast, do
not require an agreement in writing.155  Courts, therefore, can find
that a nonexclusive license was created by the conduct of parties, even
147 766 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir.
2014).
148 Id. at 932.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 933–34.
151 Id. at 943–44 (Smith, J., dissenting).
152 See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering “a
transfer of copyright without a written agreement, an arrangement apparently not uncom-
mon in the motion picture industry”).
153 See id. at 558.
154 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
155 Id. § 101.
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though no formal agreement was ever reached.  Specifically, courts
can interpret the parties’ conduct to imply that they intended to cre-
ate a license.156  Implied nonexclusive licenses constitute a powerful
tool in the hands of the courts.  Courts have strong discretion when
deciding whether to imply a license.  They are not subject to any for-
mal restrictions, and the consequences of implying a license are less
drastic for the contributor than a finding of a complete transfer or
assignment.157  Since all implied licenses are nonexclusive by defini-
tion, the judicial recognition of an implied license in a particular dis-
pute does not dramatically compromise the panoply of rights of the
owner-grantor, who remains in possession of all the exclusive rights
under the act sans the power to grant an exclusive license to another
party.158  Hence, implying a license provides courts with an attractive
way to resolve difficult copyright cases.
As an illustration, consider the case of Effects Associates, Inc. v. Co-
hen.159  Cohen, “a low-budget horror movie mogul,” commissioned Ef-
fects Associates, a special effects studio, to produce special effects
footage for the movie The Stuff.160  The studio produced the footage as
promised, but Cohen failed to pay the agreed upon consideration de-
spite repeated demands from the studio.161  At that point, Effect Asso-
ciates rescinded the contract.  Undeterred, Cohen used the footage in
the movie.162  Effect Associates sued for copyright infringement and
breach of contract.163  In a surprising decision, Judge Kozinski ruled
that there was no copyright infringement since Cohen had an implied
nonexclusive license to use the disputed footage in his movie.164  This
entitled Effects Associates to payment, but did not give Effects Associ-
ates the right to complain about past performances of the movie.165
Implied licenses can resolve some but not all of the problems of
disputes among collaborators.  Implied licenses are transfers just as
surely as express licenses and are thus subject to all of the limitations
of transfers, discussed supra.  Some rights cannot be transferred at all,
and some transfers are revocable.166
156 See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 555.
157 See id. at 559 (noting that “[c]opyright ownership is comprised of a bundle of
rights; in granting a nonexclusive license . . . [plaintiff] has given up only one stick from
that bundle . . . .”).
158 By definition, once a nonexclusive license is granted to some party, no one else can
be given an exclusive license.
159 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
160 Id. at 555.
161 Id. at 556.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 559.
165 Id.
166 See supra Part I.A.2.
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Implied licenses also come with many question marks.  The flexi-
bility of implied licenses comes with a great deal of uncertainty.  It is
impossible to know in advance whether a court will imply a license or
not or what its terms will be.  For example, it is unclear why the court
in Effects Associates decided to imply a license in favor of Cohen but
refused to do the same in many other cases where a contractual rela-
tionship went sour.167  Courts have been wary to find implied licenses,
and they have used the doctrine infrequently.168  Consequently, the
precise conditions under which the doctrine applies are unknown.
The difficulty of determining whether an implied license exists is
exceeded by the difficulty in determining the scope of the license
once the court implies its existence.  In Effects Associates, the court de-
termined that the license was broad enough to cover incorporation of
the footage in the movie and the movie’s subsequent distribution.169
But the court’s opinion said little else about the implied license.  How
long would it last?  How could it be terminated?  Did it cover produc-
tion of derivative works, such as distribution with a soundtrack
dubbed in other languages?  The key to this question should be inter-
preting the parties’ behavior, but that is no easy task.  Indeed, Judge
Kozinski’s finding that Effects Associates granted Cohen an implied
nonexclusive license largely defies logic.  Who else would want to li-
cense the special effects footage that was produced for Cohen’s hor-
ror movie?  In this case, the footage was tailor-made for Cohen’s
movie.170  There is no general demand for this footage, and it cannot
be used for any other film or audio-visual work.  The footage was pro-
duced exclusively for Cohen’s movie and has no use outside of it.  It
would have made a lot more sense to find an implied exclusive license
in this case.  But this option is barred by the Copyright Act.171  Hence,
the court, in its desire to find a way to allow Cohen to use the footage
and not let the entire movie go to waste, had to force a square peg
into a round doctrinal hole.
167 John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40–42 (1st
Cir. 2003); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 516–17 (4th Cir.
2002); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 499–502 (6th Cir. 1998); Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
Fanzine Int’l Inc., No. 98-CIV-7448 (KMW), 2000 WL 1854903, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 12,
2000).
168 Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 287 (2009).
169 Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 559.
170 See id. at 556.
171 See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
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II
WHAT COPYRIGHT LAW CAN LEARN FROM PROPERTY AND
CORPORATE LAW
The problem of multiple potential stakeholders in a single asset is
not exclusive to copyright law.  Several legal areas have had to deal
with the question of how to satisfy the claims of multiple contributors
to a single venture.  In fact, the default regime that applies to joint
works under the Copyright Act is not original to copyright law.  It was
imported from the law of property.  Property law has an extensive set
of rules that apply to owners who simultaneously hold ownership
shares in the same asset.172  Copyright law borrows from these rules in
viewing joint authors as tenants in common whose rights and obliga-
tions are largely similar to those tenants in common in real estate or
chattels.173
Another legal area that routinely deals with multiple stakeholders
is corporate law.174  Although not much utilized by copyright law, cor-
porate law doctrines provide a particularly fertile ground for finding
solutions to the challenges presented by collaborative creation, as they
regularly deal with the allocation of rights and powers among multiple
collaborators in complex projects.175
In the discussion that follows, we will draw on insights from the
theoretical literatures on both property law and corporate law, as well
as on actual doctrines from both areas to propose a new legal ap-
proach to collaborative works.
A. Property
1. Commons and Anticommons
A natural starting point for our theoretical foray into property is
the body of scholarship concerning multiple potential claimants to a
single asset.
Perhaps the most famous problem of multiple claimants arises in
the context of the “commons.”  The commons problem arises when
there are many users of a single asset with unlimited rights to exploit
it.176  As property theorists such as Harold Demsetz and, subsequently,
Garrett Hardin famously pointed out, assets with multiple owners will
172 Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1552–53. R
173 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:”
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 57 (2001).
174 See infra notes 265–270 and accompanying text. R
175 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimen-
sions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1045–46 (2008) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky I].
176 Hardin, supra note 17, at 1244. R
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be subject to overuse and ultimately to “ruin.”177  If everyone can fish
in a lake without limit, there will soon be no fish.  Intellectual prop-
erty goods are as liable to commons problems as any other property,
though the problems manifest themselves differently.  Recognizing a
copyright in every contributor would allow each to utilize the work as
she saw fit, subject only to the rights of the other contributors to do
the same.  If everyone could license and use the copyrighted work
without limit, the copyrighted asset would still be there after every-
one’s use, but it would be worthless.  Stated more generally, where
intangible goods are prone neither to exhaustion nor to overuse, the
commons problem takes the form of value dissipation.178  If every in-
dividual who contributed to a film could use it however she wanted
and license it to others, the studio would not be able to recoup its
investment in the enterprise.
Yet, at the opposite end of commons lies a different problem.  If
lawmakers were to grant every contributor a veto power to block uses
of the work, they would create an anticommons problem.  As Frank
Michelman initially noted,179 and Michael Heller developed and
demonstrated in a series of works,180 a legal regime that recognizes
blocking rights in multiple individuals invariably engenders an an-
ticommons problem that leads to underutilization of assets—another
form of value destruction.181  Heller’s examples include the manage-
ment of department stores in Russia after the collapse of commu-
nism.182  Ownership and management of the stores were divided
among thousands of worker-owners, who proved unable to make joint
decisions.183  The result, Heller shows, is the opposite of commons
property; instead of excessive use rights leading to excessive use, ex-
cessive veto rights lead to excessive idleness of the asset.184  As Heller
and others note, particularly in the context of patents,185 intellectual
property rights are vulnerable to anticommons just like other property
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 Michelman, supra note 16, at 6. R
180 HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 2; Heller, Tragedy of the Anticom- R
mons, supra note 16, at 624; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 698. R
181 Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 16, at 624. R
182 Id. at 622–23.
183 Id. at 636–37.
184 Id. at 639–40.
185 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem?  Rethinking the An-
ticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1060–63 (2008); Heller &
Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 698; Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 R
U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 186–87 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Li-
censes, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-Knowledge:
From Gene Patents to Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 27 (2010).
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rights.186  Consider, for instance, a legal rule that gives each contribu-
tor an exclusive right in her contribution to the work, making that
part her “sole and despotic dominion,” pace Blackstone.187  Such a
rule would make works wholly unusable on account of high transac-
tion costs and strategic coordination problems.188
2. Three Dimensions of Property
How can lawmakers navigate this treacherous course between
competing threats to the use of copyrighted assets?  In a past work, we
observed that property policymaking necessarily involves choices
along three different dimensions: (1) number of owners, (2) the con-
figuration of the asset, and (3) the scope of rights.189
Property law always involves defining some right or set of rights
belonging to one or more owners in a given asset.  We will show that
our three-dimensional analysis is extremely useful for resolving
problems raised by collaboration in copyright.  Specifically, we will
show that while collaborations are naturally conceived of as a chal-
lenge along the axis of owners, a solution can be found along the axis
of rights.
Let us begin by describing the three dimensions of property more
carefully.  We start with the dimension of owners.190  The number of
owners can vary from one to infinity, and indeed many real-world as-
sets are owned by multiple owners.  Nonetheless, property luminaries
such as William Blackstone,191 and years later Harold Demsetz,192
built their understandings of property on simplified single owner
models, and for good reason.193  When an asset has only one owner,
the owner bears and receives, for the most part, the full marginal costs
and benefits of her decisions concerning the asset’s management and
186 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 698. R
187 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1129
(2009) (citations omitted).
188 See id. at 1137–38.
189 Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1015. R
190 See id. at 1022 (stating the three dimensions of property as owner, asset, and
dominion).
191 See id. at 1015; Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 869, 877 (2013) (“Blackstone’s widely cited assertion that property is ‘that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe’ brought [the
ownership] model to fame.”).
192 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
193 See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1015 (stating that Blackstone de- R
scribed the ideal number of owners in the optimal dominion as one); Demsetz, supra note
192, at 350, 354–56 (proposing that property rights develop to internalize externalities and R
that between the two idealized forms of ownership, communal ownership and private own-
ership, private ownership of land will internalize many of the external costs associated with
communal ownership).
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sale.194  Consequently, a single owner is often motivated to make opti-
mal decisions where multiple owners may not.195  Why, then, do assets
often have multiple owners?196  Scholars such as Francesco Parisi197
and Ben Depoorter198 have powerfully demonstrated that over time
property rights tend to fragment.199  The most basic mechanism by
which fragmentation occurs is inheritance.200  Alice may own Black-
acre as a single owner for her entire life.  Upon her death, however, it
is likely that her right will pass to more than one heir or devisee.  As
the number of transfers grows, the number of rightsholders increases
as well, and with it the potential for conflicts.  The same is true, of
course, of expressive works.  As we explained above,201 copyright law
recognizes the possibility of more than one owner.202  Furthermore,
since copyright protection lasts for seventy years past the life of the
author, ownership in copyrights is almost certain to pass through sev-
eral generations, leading to a high likelihood of fragmentation.203
The second dimension of property policy is assets, and, more spe-
cifically, the configuration of assets.204  Consider tangible assets first.
The physical dimensions of assets can be modified in response to
changing social preferences.  For example, a large tract of land may
be repeatedly subdivided or combined with neighboring parcels.  Nat-
urally, the optimal size varies over time as the land is put to different
uses.  In an agricultural society the optimal tract size is likely larger
194 See Demsetz, supra note 192, at 356 (asserting that private ownership concentrates R
the benefits and costs onto the private owner).
195 See id. at 356–57 (contrasting the communal owners and private owners’ incentives
to economic externalities).
196 Barzel takes the position that assets often have multiple owners. See YORAM BARZEL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6 (2d ed. 1997).  This is due to Barzel’s economic,
rather than legal, definition of ownership as the ability to extract value from an asset. See
id. at 4–5.
197 Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595 (2002); Francesco Parisi,
The Fall and Rise of Functional Property 1, 10–11 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 05-38, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=850565.
198 Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights: A Functional
Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes 1, 18–20 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., &
Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 284, 2003), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.
edu/lepp_papers/284.
199 See id. at 18 (explaining how the free creation of servitudes leads to the partitioning
of property rights).
200 See id.
201 Supra Part I.A.
202 Supra Part I.A.1.b–c.
203 See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 44, 55 (2004).  Indeed, the statute actually
requires passing along certain rights to successors in interest in ways that are certain to
lead to fragmentation.  Consider, for example, the law’s treatment of termination.  In this
context, see Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite?  Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in Copy-
right Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 74–75 (2013).
204 See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1022. R
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than in an urban society.205  But size is not the only facet of an asset
subject to change: there are other asset characteristics that can be
bundled together or kept separate.  Common interest communities
are a case in point.  Common interest communities offer a mix of pri-
vate residential units and shared amenities.206  By bundling together
private units and shared amenities, common interest communities of-
fer dwellers an especially attractive combination of asset traits as is
evidenced by the growing popularity of this property form.207  In a
similar vein, buildings in large metropolitan areas often combine resi-
dential and commercial uses in order to maximize the value of the
asset.  Asset configuration plays an even bigger role in the case of chat-
tels.  Compare older generation cellular phones to more modern
smart phones.  Originally, cellular phones were a single-purpose com-
munication device.  Today, they are much closer to personal portable
computers with multiple communication capabilities.208
Intangible goods, such as copyrights and patents, can be even
more readily reconfigured.  At present the underlying asset protected
by copyright law is an original expression.209  Protection does not ex-
tend to the ideas.210  One could easily imagine, however, a legal sys-
tem that affords protection to ideas, either on a stand-alone basis211 or
when they are coupled with original expression.212  Moreover, as we
noted earlier, copyright protection applies to the components of a
copyrighted work, even when the work is a seamless whole.213  For in-
stance, a single photograph or greeting card may have various pro-
205 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332 (1993) (suggesting
that bigger land parcels can minimize cost for grazing livestock on expansive group-owned
pastures).
206 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: PROPERTY 146 (2010).
207 See id. at 150 (“[I]n many states today, more than one-half of new residential con-
struction is organized in [common interest communities].”); Michael A. Heller, The Bound-
aries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183 (1999) (“Common-interest
communities . . . are perhaps the most significant form of social reorganization of late
twentieth-century America.”).
208 Jennifer Lynn, The Growing Smartphone Popularity Among Retail Consumers, DROID
REP. (May 15, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.droidreport.com/growing-smartphone-popu
larity-among-retail-consumers-9654.
209 See Depoorter, supra note 203, at 53 (“Copyright law protects the expression of R
ideas.”).
210 See id.
211 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV.
395, 396 (2005) (suggesting that since inventions embody ideas, millions of ideas have
indirectly become the subject of private property).
212 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access
Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 93–95 (2009) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky
II] (recognizing the weaknesses of exclusion-based development of property rights over
expressive content and introducing the open source movement as an attempt to preserve
private rights with greatly diluted owner dominion).
213 Supra Part I.A.1.c.
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tected component elements, such as an overall “look and feel.”214
The divisibility of copyrighted works is particularly striking when the
expressive goods consist of multiple contributions, such as software,
films, or even literary works.  The law can grant protection to each
contribution in its own right or only to the combined product of all
the different combinations.215  And, of course, the law may protect
both the components and the work as a whole.216
The third and final dimension of property is rights, or domin-
ion.217  The scope of rights that attend property runs the gamut from
a mere license to use an asset in a particular way all the way to full
unfettered ownership of the asset with all relevant attendant pow-
ers.218  In an oft-cited statement, William Blackstone famously de-
scribed property as “the sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”219  But
as many modern property rights theorists have shown, nothing in the
definition of property rights implies full exclusion of others.220  In re-
ality, property regimes vacillate between the diodes of exclusion and
management.221  Some property doctrines, such as trespass, focus on
exclusion, whereas others, such as nuisance, are designed around
management regimes that do not involve exclusionary powers.222
Management regimes typically confer upon the relevant rightsholders
214 See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970) (“total concept and feel” protected); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d
444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“creation of the subject” protectable).
215 Supra Part I.A.1.b–c.
216 Supra Part I.A.1.b–c.
217 See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1022. R
218 See id. at 1030–31 (discussing property rights as a function of the three dimensions
of ownership, asset configuration, and owner dominion which can be redefined at the
request of property consumers, including constituents and lobbyists).
219 Id. at 1015.
220 See id. at 1015, 1023 (explaining that the Blackstonian ideal which includes total
exclusion rights serves as the idealized goal of property definition but has proved an inac-
curate reference point for property theorists).
221 See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855–56
(2012); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Conflicts in Property, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
37, 41 (2005); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 974–75 (2004) [hereinafter Exclusion and Property Rules]; Henry E. Smith, Exclu-
sion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453,
454–55 (2002) [hereinafter Exclusion Versus Governance] (“[R]ights fall on a spectrum be-
tween the poles of exclusion and governance.”).
222 See Dagan & Heller, supra note 221, at 40–41 (asserting that although the doctrinal R
home for property conflicts is trespass law if property is about exclusion, governance typi-
fies property at least as much as exclusion does); Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note
221, at 992–93 (asserting that trespass is an exclusion regime while nuisance partakes both R
of an exclusionary and governance-like aspect); Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 221, R
at 455 (asserting that nuisance law reflects governance strategy compared to trespass and
property law).
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various use rights that may be exercised subject to the rights of others,
without granting any party full dominion over the relevant asset.223
Other property regimes, such as time shares, involve partial exclusion
powers, allowing each rightsholder to have full dominion of the asset,
but only for a limited time.224
Insofar as dominion, or scope of rights, is concerned, intellectual
property law offers an especially impressive range of permutations.  Al-
though the statutory default is to grant owners the full panoply of
rights, owners have the power to reduce the scope of protection.225
Organizations such as the Creative Commons offer copyright owners a
menu of default settings that allows them to choose different packages
of protection, all of which represent less protection relative to the
scope of rights granted to them under the Copyright Act.226  Similarly,
in the patent context, scholars have proposed various alternative for-
mulations of patent grants, proposing the enactment of “quasi-pat-
ents” that would avail only against direct competitors,227 “research
patents” for incomplete inventions,228 and “null patents” for failed in-
ventions.229  In a recent paper, we offered a detailed blueprint for a
bottom-up design of copyright and patent protection that allows right-
sholders to tailor the level of protection to their individual needs.230
It should be evident that copyright is as open to three-dimen-
sional solutions as any other field of property.  Given the great
amount of flexibility in shaping owner, asset, and dominion,
lawmakers and judges can resolve problems along any of the three
axes.  Yet, in the case of multiple contributions to copyrighted works,
223 See Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 221, at 979 (characterizing the govern- R
ance strategy as one in which rights are delineated using signals that pick out and protect
individual uses and user behavior).
224 See Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1022 n.31. R
225 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collec-
tive Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302–03 (1996) (suggesting that the prop-
erty rule entitlements granted at the outset actually lead to a liability rule-like regime
because members, and not the government, determine the menu of terms).
226 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement
of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
271, 296–97 (2007) (describing how a copyright owner could opt to retain all private rights
that the Copyright Act grants him, dedicate his work to the public domain, or place his
work within the semicommons provided by the Creative Commons); Robert P. Merges, A
New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 199 (2004) (“The various Crea-
tive Commons licenses can thus be seen as a menu of waiver options from which creators
themselves can select.”).
227 Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207,
208 (2011).
228 Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015).
229 Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2062 (2012).
230 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 MICH.
L. REV. 231 (2014).
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legislators and judges to date have focused their efforts on only two of
the three dimensions: the number of owners and the configuration of
the asset.231  The third dimension—the scope of rights—has been
completely neglected.
The two cases of Aalmuhammed232 and Tasini233 provide a perfect
illustration.  In Aalmuhammed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
viewed the case through the narrow prism of number of owners.234
The issue at hand was whether to recognize Aalmuhammed as a
coowner of the copyright in the film and thereby increase the number
of owners from one to two.235  Adhering to the default preference for
a single owner, the court denied Aalmuhammed’s claim to a copyright
in the film, even though it was agreed by all parties that he met the
prerequisites of copyrightable contribution and intent.236
In Tasini, the court took a different route.  The Tasini decision is
all about asset configuration.237  Instead of treating the digitized con-
tent of the New York Times daily editions as a unified collective work,
the Court agreed that the contributions of the appellants, freelance
journalists who wrote articles for the newspaper, should be spliced off
from the rest of the paper content and accorded independent copy-
right protection on a free-standing basis.238  In our terminology, the
majority in Tasini redefined the asset by breaking up the digitized ver-
sions of the Times into two categories of independently copyrightable
modules: content produced by employees of the New York Times and
the content produced by freelance journalists.  The copyright in the
former was held by the New York Times based on the
work-made-for-hire doctrine, whereas the copyright in the latter was
held by the individual contributors, and could only be used by the
Times in accordance with a restrictive license.239
231 See infra notes 232–245 and accompanying text. R
232 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
233 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
234 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232 (analyzing whether Aalmuhammed qualifies as
a coauthor).
235 See id. at 1230.
236 See id. at 1235 (concluding that although Aalmuhammed made very valuable contri-
butions to the movie, that was not enough for coauthorship of a joint work).
237 See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487–88 (discussing the distinction between copyright in each
separate contribution to a collective work and copyright in the collective work as a whole).
238 See id. at 488 (holding that the print publishers and the electronic publishers in-
fringed the copyrights of the freelance authors because the databases in question did not
reproduce and distribute articles standing alone in context, as part of a collective work to
which the author contributed, as part of any revision thereof, or as part of any later collec-
tive work in the same series).
239 See id. at 498 & n.7 (holding that the freelance authors hold undisputed copyrights
in the articles, and that the publishers would not have qualified as authors under the
works-made-for-hire doctrine because the freelance authors were neither “employees” nor
“commissioned” by the publishers through “a written instrument signed by both parties”
indicating that the articles shall be considered “works made for hire”).
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Both the Aalmuhammed court and the Tasini court appealed to
property theory for help with the challenge at hand.  Unfortunately,
neither court saw the full picture.  The Aalmuhammed court was wor-
ried in part that raising the number of owners above one would create
a commons problem that may lead to value dissipation.240  The court
feared that giving Aalmuhammed a copyright in the movie would turn
him into a coequal owner with the movie studio with the same use
rights and exclusionary powers.241  It therefore decided to deny his
ownership claim.242
The Tasini court faced an opposite challenge.  It sought a way to
give the free-lance journalists who made contributions to the New York
Times a second bite of the apple.  The Court vindicated their separate
copyrights and imposed a restrictive interpretation on the mandatory
collective work license that accompanied the publication of their arti-
cles in a newspaper.243  The Court was clearly of the opinion that this
result is desirable from a distributive standpoint and would reinforce
initial incentives to create.244  Hence, the Court separated the free-
lancers’ contributions from the rest of the journalistic content, be-
stowing a sole-owner status on each of the freelancers with respect to
subsequent uses of the contributions outside of the print edition of
the New York Times.245  Unfortunately, the decision opened a Pan-
dora’s box by giving contributors to collective works the ability to
block subsequent uses of the content contemplated by the compiler of
the collective content.  From a property perspective, the Tasini court
created an anticommons problem that property policymakers typically
strive to avoid.
Both courts erred in overlooking the third dimension of scope of
rights in forming their decisions.  The Aalmuhammed court could have
recognized a more limited set of rights than a full-fledged set of copy-
right rights described in section 106 of the Copyright Act.246  The
court did not have to give Aalmuhammed the power to authorize dis-
tribution of the film or the right to make derivative works.  Instead, it
could have given him a right to a certain percentage of the proceeds
from the movie.  Similarly, the Tasini court did not have to give such a
narrow interpretation to the collective work license as to effectively
splice off the freelancers’ parts from the journalistic content as a
whole.  Rather, the Court could have granted the freelancers a limited
right to royalties, which was precisely what they sought.
240 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235.
241 See id.
242 Id. at 1236.
243 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488.
244 See id. at 501–03.
245 See id. at 504–06.
246 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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Copyright law’s conception of the rights of joint authors is taken
directly from property law’s rules on tenancy in common.247  Each
owner has an undivided right in the whole that can be transferred and
otherwise exercised without limitation, subject only to the duty to ac-
count for profits to other owners.248  But this allocation of rights
among owners is just one of many possible ways to define property
rights.  There are many property forms that allocate rights unequally
among owners.  For instance, where ownership of an asset is divided
among present and future interest holders, only the present interest
owners have a current right of possession,249 while future interest own-
ers must suffice with exercising their rights to block “waste” of the
asset.250
3. Trusts
Of particular interest to us is the instrument of trust.  The crea-
tion of a trust results in the bifurcation of ownership into a legal inter-
est and an equitable interest.251  The creator, or settlor, of the trust
transfers her title to a trustee, who thereupon becomes the owner of
the legal title.252  At the same time, however, the creator appoints ben-
eficiaries, vesting in them an equitable title to the benefits to be ac-
crued from the assets or money that were put in trust.253  The settlor
may spell out the rights of the beneficiaries and duties of the trustees
in an instrument of trust.254  However, the law also imposes a
mandatory relationship between trustee and beneficiary: trustees owe
a fiduciary duty to manage the trust assets for the benefit of the bene-
ficiaries with a high degree of fidelity.255  One of the primary purposes
of the unique ownership structure engendered by trusts is to ensure
superior management of assets by concentrating all management deci-
sions in the hands of managers who possess the requisite expertise for
the task, while, at the same time, securing the benefit of that expertise
for the individuals or entities whom the settlor of the trust held
247 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); Kwall, supra note 173, at 57. R
248 Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 867,
875 (1989).
249 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externali-
ties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 226 (2012).
250 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage
Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1449–50 (2012); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra
note 249, at 226; Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 671 R
(2014).
251 Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 643, 653 (2014).
252 Id. at 658.
253 Id. at 653–54.
254 See id.
255 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 543 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 36 12-JUN-15 12:29
1050 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1015
dear.256  The beneficiaries, in other words, are entitled to receive the
residual benefit arising from the trust.257
The separation of legal and equitable ownership has many advan-
tages—it concentrates all assets in the hands of a single owner, it guar-
antees superior management of the trust funds, it carries out the will
of the settlor, and guarantees a stream of income to the benefi-
ciaries—but it also has an obvious downside: it gives rise to an agency
problem.  Although the trustee is remunerated for her labor, there is
always a risk that she might try to increase her reward at the expense
of the beneficiaries, either by shirking on her duties or by diverting
funds from the beneficiaries to herself.  To address this problem, the
law imposes a fiduciary duty on the trustee to act in good faith to
further the interests of the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms
of the trust instrument.258  Breach of the duty allows the settlor and
the beneficiary to seek redress against the trustee.259
As we shall show, adapting the trust to the needs of collaborative
copyright works can provide an alternative ownership structure that
better meets the needs of contributors to collaborative works as well as
the interests of society in production and exploitation of creative
works of expression.260
B. Corporate Law
A second source of guidance for our proposal comes from corpo-
rate law.
Corporations, by their very design, embody the ideal of separa-
tion of ownership and control.  By recognizing corporations as legal
entities, corporate law enables the concentration of all corporate as-
sets in the hands of a fictional single owner, namely the corporation
itself.261  The corporation, in turn, may be owned by one or multiple
owners who receive shares of the enterprise.262  The shareholders, qua
shareholders, do not run the daily operations of the corporate en-
tity.263  Rather, they appoint a board of directors that, in turn, elects a
256 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
637–38 (1995); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 633–34 (2004).
257 Sitkoff, supra note 256, at 646–47. R
258 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., supra note 255, § 543. R
259 Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 767, 776–77 (2000); Sitkoff, supra note 256, at 679–80; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, R
Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 572–73 (2003).
260 Infra Part II.C.
261 John Armour et al., The Essential Elements of Corporate Law: What Is Corporate Law? 1,
6 (Discussion Paper No. 643, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olin_center/papers/pdf/Kraakman_643.pdf.
262 Id. at 11.
263 Id. at 12.
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management for the corporation.264  The board of directors not only
selects the officers of the corporation but also determines their com-
pensation.265  The shareholders’ ownership is thus reduced, in prac-
tice, to a right to profits from the enterprise while control is shared
among directors and managers.266
The structure of corporations gives rise to several conflicts of in-
terest, or agency costs.  The first, and most famous one, is between the
management and the shareholders.267  The division of management
and control raises the specter that the management might act to en-
hance its narrow self-interests at the expense of the shareholders.268
For example, the management can increase its compensation, hire
friends and relatives, shirk on the job, or engage in “empire build-
ing”—practices that increase the size of the corporation, as opposed
to its profits.269  The second conflict of interest in this is between
bondholders and shareholders.  Both groups have a claim to the cor-
porate profits, but while the claim of the bondholders is fixed (or in-
variant) and is determined in advance, the payoff to the shareholders
depends on the amount of the corporate profits.270  Thus, sharehold-
ers typically prefer to see the corporation take on more risk that bond-
holders would rather avoid.271  Finally, there is a conflict of interest
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  The
concern, in this case, is that the controlling shareholders may take
advantage of their power to obtain private benefits from the corpora-
tion through self-dealing.  For example, the controllers may direct the
corporation to sell corporate assets below market price to other com-
panies the controllers own.272
Corporate law employs a wide array of strategies to minimize
those costs.  The officers of the corporation owe a duty of care and a
duty of loyalty to the corporation, which puts them under a legal obli-
gation to do the best they can to further the interests of the sharehold-
ers.273  Furthermore, the management is subject to constant
264 Id.
265 Matthew Farrell, Note, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive Compensation: The
Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America Corp., 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 169, 173 (2010).
266 Bell & Parchomovsky I, supra note 175, at 1045–46. R
267 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Prob-
lem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71–72 (2003).
268 See id.
269 See id. at 72.
270 Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979).
271 Id.
272 David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 1023, 1031 (1991).
273 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009).
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monitoring from the board of directors.274  The directors, too, owe a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders (or, more precisely, to the corpora-
tion).275  Furthermore, the shareholders can appoint their representa-
tion on the board of directors.276  Of course, shareholders can also
protect themselves from managerial abuse in any single corporation
by diversifying their portfolio of investments.277
To secure bondholders (and other creditors) against excessive
risk, a wide array of contractual measures is employed to constrain the
ability of the shareholders to engage in risky investments.278  Finally,
the law imposes various restrictions on self-dealing and incorporates
various protections of minority shareholders to address the potential
for abuse by controlling shareholders.279
Despite the various agency costs inherent to corporate structures,
the separation of management and ownership in corporations gives
rise to important advantages.  First of all, by separating capital from
management, it allows individuals with strong managerial skills to put
their talents at the service of capital owners.280  In addition, corpora-
tions enable capital owners with different risk preferences to take dif-
ferent stakes in corporations in accordance with their risk
preferences.281  For example, risk-seeking individuals can invest in
shares and even options, while risk-averse individuals can become
bondholders.  Finally, as Ronald Coase famously pointed out, corpora-
tions offer a superior alternative to market transactions when transac-
tion costs are high.282  Coase observed that production of goods or
services falls into one of two paradigms: markets and corporations.283
Markets operate on the basis of voluntary exchange via contracts.284
They can allocate resources to their highest-value users when transac-
tion costs are sufficiently low.285  When transaction costs are high,
274 James D. Cox & Nis Jul Clausen, The Monitoring Duties of Directors Under the EC Direc-
tives: A View from the United States Experience, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 29, 31 (1992);
George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the
Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REV. 623, 623 (1981).
275 Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
457, 464 (2009); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias,
32 J. CORP. L. 833, 835 (2007).
276 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 118 (2014).
277 Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99,
108, 111–12 (1989).
278 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 302–03 (1983).
279 See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Real-
ity, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 401–08 (2003).
280 Fama & Jensen, supra note 278, at 315. R
281 Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276, 282 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
282 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).
283 See id. at 387–89.
284 See id. at 390–91.
285 Id. at 389.
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however, markets will not operate optimally as a mechanism for re-
source allocation.286  Corporations, on the other hand, are hierarchi-
cal structures where decisions are made by managerial fiat.287  In
other words, production and allocation decisions within corporations
do not require consent, and hence, they are not affected by market
transaction costs.288
As a rule, decisions within corporations are made by the manage-
ment and do not require approval from the board or the general as-
sembly of shareholders.289  In fact, shareholders are not involved in
the day-to-day management of the corporation.  Their input is re-
quired only in exceptional cases, such as amendment of the corporate
articles or bylaws, approval of mergers and acquisitions, and the sale
of assets.290  Typically, decisions are made by a simple majority.291
However, in special cases, such as sale of assets, the law imposes a
super-majority requirement.292  In even more extreme cases in which
self-dealing is involved, the law imposes a requirement for a
majority-of-a-minority approval.293  The structures and rules of corpo-
rate law inform our proposal for reforming copyright law.294
Before moving on to our own proposal, we should take notice of
a different perspective on the insights corporations can give us into
collaborative production of copyrighted works.  In a recent important
contribution,295 Anthony Casey and Andreas Sawicki look to the theo-
retical literature on industrial organization and on the allocation of
rights within firms, pioneered by Ronald Coase296 and developed by
Oliver Williamson,297 Oliver Hart,298 and Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz,299 to explain and criticize current law regarding copyright
286 Id. at 390–91.
287 See id.
288 Id. at 391.
289 See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 251 (1999) (describing management’s virtually absolute control
over a corporation’s internal matters).
290 See id. at 311; Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 407, 418 (2006).
291 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 400 (1983).
292 See id. at 399.
293 Goshen, supra note 279, at 402. R
294 See generally Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 748 n.20 (1997) (explaining the various majority requirements in
corporate law within the Calabresi-Melamedian property-liability rules framework).
295 See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1687. R
296 See Coase, supra note 282, at 389. R
297 Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considera-
tions, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113–14 (1971).
298 OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 56–61 (1995).
299 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 785–95 (1972).
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ownership.  Casey and Sawicki do not focus on doctrines in corporate
law.300  Rather, they aim to utilize the theoretical insights in other
fields to devise a framework for determining how copyright doctrines
affect the organizational framework in which copyrighted works are
produced.301
Beginning with the observation that firms are hierarchical organi-
zations, Casey and Sawicki note that production within firms predomi-
nantly relies on managerial command and control.302  The
decision-making power in firms is held by the management.303  The
management is charged with allocating tasks among employees, assess-
ing and monitoring their performance, and rewarding and penalizing
performance.304  Building on the firm analogy, Casey and Sawicki ar-
gue for the importance of concentrating ownership and control in the
hands of the single person or entity that can best supervise the crea-
tive process and its inputs.305  While Casey and Sawicki acknowledge
that different ownership regimes are appropriate for different modes
of production of intellectual products, they call for the use of broad,
derivate works rights and the work-made-for-hire doctrine when the
law wishes to encourage collaborative cooperation.306  Noting that
both doctrines concentrate ownership and control in the hands of a
single person or entity, Casey and Sawicki argue that wider use of the
doctrines would improve ex ante incentives to create and minimize
strategic problems ex post.307
Although we share Casey and Sawicki’s concerns and we draw in-
spiration from many of the same theoretical sources, we arrive at a
radically different conclusion.  We propose a policy solution that, to a
large degree, may be viewed as antithetical to those espoused by Casey
and Sawicki.
C. Copyright Trusts
In this subpart, we propose a new copyright structure that courts
would be able to apply, at their discretion, to resolve disputes concern-
ing works consisting of multiple contributions.  Before delving into
the details of our proposal, it is important to emphasize two things.
First, the regime we propose would be judicially administered and not
reliant upon statutory amendments.  It therefore would add to, rather
than replace, the existing regimes.  Courts would be at liberty in
300 See Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1690. R
301 See id.
302 See id. at 1695–99.
303 See id. at 1708–09.
304 See id. at 1695–96.
305 See id. at 1702.
306 See id. at 1721–22, 1727.
307 See id. at 1693, 1723–26, 1729–35.
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appropriate cases to apply the doctrines of work made for hire, im-
plied license, joint ownership, and the other rules we discussed ear-
lier.308  Our goal is to add another instrument to the toolkit of
copyright lawmakers—one which, we argue, provides an ownership
structure that better meets the needs of incentivizing production and
promoting optimal exploitation of creative works.  Second, and relat-
edly, our proposed framework is open to contributors as a contractual
choice.  Collaborators could choose to contract in advance into our
proposed structure; after the fact, of course, courts could still impose
the structure by judicial decision in the absence of a contractual
arrangement.
Our framework is designed to allow courts to achieve a more eq-
uitable and efficient resolution of disputes concerning rights in works
resulting from multiple contributions.  As in trust and corporate struc-
tures, at the core of our proposal lies the idea of separation between
ownership and control.  In our view, a work may have multiple own-
ers, but only one among them should have the power to make deci-
sions about its economic exploitation.309  All other owners would be
entitled to monetary remuneration but would lack managerial power.
The owner with the decision-making power would be called
“owner-trustee.”  The other owners would be termed “owner-benefi-
ciaries.”  The chosen terminology is not accidental.  Similar to trust
structures, the owner-trustee would owe a fiduciary duty to the owner-
beneficiaries and would have to act in good faith to further their inter-
ests.  Furthermore, our proposal incorporates various mechanisms to
prevent the owner-trustee from enriching herself at the expense of
the beneficiary-owners.  Some of the protections we provide are taken
from standard property law.  For instance, owner beneficiaries would
have the power to bring an action for accounting against the
owner-trustee, as well as sue for waste.310  Other defenses are taken
from corporate law and include restrictions on self-dealing and on
other forms of “tunneling” (i.e., transactions intended to transfer
wealth from the owner-beneficiaries to the owner-trustee or her
relatives).311
308 See supra Part I.
309 Our view echoes what Robert Merges wrote about how to approach useful knowl-
edge held by traditional communities.  Merges noted that in such cases, the traditional
leaders of the group represent the entire community and protect the interests of its indi-
vidual members.  Merges suggests that “[w]hat is needed in cases of dispersed creativity is
to identify similar representative people or entities.”  Merges, supra note 3, at 1190. R
310 For descriptions of the accounting and waste remedies, see GEORGE GLEASON BO-
GERT ET AL., supra note 255, §§ 861, 967. R
311 For a description of laws of self-dealing and “tunneling,” see Vladimir Atanasov et
al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 2–3 (2011); Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trust-
ees and the Exoneration Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions Involving Trust Prop-
erty?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43, 45–57 (1998).
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Interestingly, the Copyright Act already contains a reference to
“beneficial ownership.”  According to section 501 of the Copyright
Act, the “beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is
entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particu-
lar right . . . .”312  While “beneficial owner” is not defined by the Act,
Nimmer’s treatise acknowledges that “[p]resumably, reference is in-
tended to the general law of trusts.”313  Courts have utilized the con-
cept of “beneficial ownership” in relation to the narrow question
addressed by section 501, namely when nonowners have the right to
bring suit. In particular, courts have generally held that “an author
who assigns his legal rights to a work in exchange for royalties from its
exploitation has a beneficial interest sufficient for statutory standing
under § 501(b).”314  Our proposal would take the concept of benefi-
cial ownership and apply it more generally to questions of copyright
ownership.
To operationalize our proposal, a court would have to make two
decisions.  First, it would have to decide whom, among the various
contributors, to appoint an owner-trustee.  As a rule, the owner-trus-
tee should be the individual or entity that added the most value to the
work and therefore has the highest economic stake in the success of
the work.  In some special cases, the court may assign the role of an
owner-trustee to a smaller contributor if she has special managerial
skills or is uniquely positioned to exploit the work commercially.
Often, the decision whom to appoint an owner-trustee would be
rather straightforward.  In a case like Aalmuhammed,315 for example, it
is clear that the movie studio should be considered the owner-trustee.
The movie studio, Warner Brothers, not only made a much greater
investment in the work, but also has vastly superior experience than
Aalmuhammed in the promotion of movies.  At other times, though,
the choice may be more difficult.  But our framework is flexible
enough to accommodate even those cases.
The second decision a court would have to make is how to divide
ownership shares among the various contributors involved.  The own-
ership shares (whether trustee-owner or beneficial-owner), in turn,
would determine the financial rewards of each contributor.  For ex-
ample, if the court were to decide that a certain contributor is entitled
to a thirty percent ownership share, she would be entitled to receive
thirty percent of the proceeds generated by the work.  In determining
the ownership share, the court would take into account the relative
312 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012).
313 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.02 (rev. ed.
2012).
314 Smith v. Casey, 741 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2014).
315 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
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contribution of each of the parties to the final product.  Once again
we will use the facts of Aalmuhammed to illustrate how this should
work.  Although Aalmuhammed clearly contributed to the movie, his
contribution was a small part of the final product.  Aalmuhammed
made a few small conceptual contributions to the movie—for exam-
ple, he introduced several small changes to the script to make depic-
tions of Muslim prayer more authentic.316  Yet, it is clear that
Aalmuhammed was not the mastermind of the movie.  He did not
contribute to the overall plot or to many other aspects of the movie as
a whole.  Given that Aalmuhammed did not come up with the concept
of the movie, did not direct it or produce it, and that his contributions
were relatively minor both in terms of importance and scope, his own-
ership stake should probably be less than one percent.  While a frac-
tion of a percent is a relatively small ownership stake, it must be kept
in mind that the movie grossed nearly $50 million.317
Once a court selected the owner-trustee and assigns ownership
shares to all the parties involved, the owner-trustee would have sole
discretion as to how to manage the work in order to maximize its
value for all the owners.  The main right of the beneficiary-owners
would be to receive a prorated share, commensurate with their owner-
ship interests from the proceeds generated from the work.  Nonethe-
less, if the owner-trustee failed to act in good faith to further this goal,
the owner-beneficiaries would have the power to commence legal ac-
tion to compel the owner-trustee to undertake different courses of
action.  For instance, the owner-beneficiaries would be able to sue the
owner-trustee for waste if she were to destroy the work (or copies
thereof) or engage in other practices that depleted the value of the
work.  To prevent frivolous suits, we propose that courts adopt the
business judgment rule in adjudicating suits against owner-trustees.318
The business judgment rule, while respecting decisionmakers’ fiduci-
ary duties, also grants decisionmakers a high degree of deference in
exercising their judgment regarding commercial matters.319  This
standard of review would strike the right balance between the interests
of the parties.  On the one hand, it would give the owner-trustee suffi-
cient elbow room to operate.  On the other hand, it would provide the
316 See id. at 1230.
317 Malcolm X, BOX OFF. MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=malcolmx
.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
318 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 88 (2004).
319 See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17 (Del.
1994) (stating that the business judgment rule permits the court to accord “great defer-
ence to the substance of the directors’ decision” and “not invalidate the decision [or]
examine its reasonableness”); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment
Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 457 (1985).
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owner-beneficiaries protection against bad faith acts of mismanage-
ment and intentional abuse.
As in the context of trusts and corporations, the owner-trustee’s
fiduciary duties would give owner-beneficiaries legal causes of action.
The owner-beneficiaries would be able to block the owner-trustee
from engaging in self-dealing, for example.320  To illustrate,
owner-beneficiaries would be able to obtain an injunction against the
owner-trustee should she attempt to license the work to another com-
pany she owns at a submarket price.  However, they would not be able
to block standard licensing transactions and would not have the right
to file for partition of the work—either by sale or in kind.321
Our proposal offers several important advantages relative to the
existing doctrine.  First, in keeping with the constitutional ambition to
encourage the production of original works,322 our proposal guaran-
tees that each contributor would be rewarded proportionately to her
contribution unless the parties contractually agreed otherwise.  The
implementation of our proposal preserves the contractual baseline
that characterizes current doctrines, while providing assurance to au-
thors, for whom complete contracting is impractical or inefficient,
that their labor would not go unremunerated.  By giving authors an
ownership stake that is commensurate with their contribution, our
proposal enhances both productive efficiency and fairness.  As far as
productive efficiency is concerned, our proposal would have a salutary
effect on the creation of expressive works in high transaction cost en-
vironments and especially in cases of amateur authors who are not
familiar with the legal intricacies of the Copyright Act.
The second advantage of our proposal is that it improves the use
and commercial exploitation of collaborative works after their crea-
tion.  Our proposal largely takes away the power of individual contrib-
utors to veto uses of collaborative works or to deplete works of all
commercial value by splicing off their contribution from the rest of
the work.323  Relative to its doctrinal alternatives, our framework only
minimally relies on property rule protections in the form of injunc-
tions and employs instead, liability rule protection in the form of
320 Baron, supra note 311, at 43. R
321 For descriptions of owners’ rights to partition, see Flood v. Kalinyaprak, 2004 MT
15, 84 P.3d 27, 32 (Mont. 2004); Jaffe, supra note 3, at 1564 n.99.  Functionally, the court’s R
ruling in Garcia v. Google, Inc. gave Garcia a right to partition the film in kind.  766 F.3d 929
(9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).  This would not be
possible under our proposal.
322 Michael B. Gerdes, Comment, Getting Beyond Constitutionally Mandated Originality as
a Prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1461, 1462 (1992).
323 As we noted supra Part II.A.1, separating works into component parts essentially
creates anticommons likely to undermine productive use of the work.
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monetary payment to be decided by the court.324  An important bene-
ficiary from our proposal is the general public who will not be ad-
versely affected by conflicts among authors.
Third, and finally, our proposal has the potential to reduce adju-
dicative costs.  Admittedly, the implementation of our proposal re-
quires judicial action.  We are also cognizant of the fact that the two
determinations courts would need to make—appointing an
owner-trustee and determining the ownership stakes of all contribu-
tors—may not always be straightforward.  That said, it must be borne
in mind that our proposal is meant as a supplement, not a replace-
ment, to existing doctrines.  We do not argue that it should be admin-
istered in all cases.  Quite the contrary, we contend that our solution
should be reserved to those cases in which it can be administered at a
sufficiently low cost.  Specifically, courts should turn to our solution
when the owner-trustee is easily identifiable and the ownership stakes
of the parties can be cheaply determined.  When these conditions ob-
tain, our proposal holds the promise of economizing on judicial re-
sources.  Obviously, this is also an important limitation on our
proposal: when the twin determinations necessary to operationalize
our proposal cannot be made cost effectively, courts would be well
advised to turn to other alternatives.
III
OBJECTIONS
In this Part we anticipate and address four potential objections to
our proposal.  The first one consists of the argument that all rights
(and disagreements) concerning the allocation of rights in collabora-
tive works should be resolved contractually.  The second objection is
that courts are ill fitted to assess the relative contributions of contribu-
tors to collaborative works.  The third objection is that current doc-
trine cannot accommodate our proposal and therefore it cannot be
implemented without legislative reform.  The fourth and final objec-
tion is that our proposal is incomplete and cannot resolve all collabo-
ration problems.  We address each of the four objections in turn and
show that none of them presents an insurmountable challenge to our
proposal.
A. The Contractual Perspective
At the heart of the contractual objection lies the idea that private
ordering via contracts should control the allocation of rights in
324 For a discussion of the distinction between property-rule and liability-rule protec-
tion, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (1996).
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collaborative works.  The theoretical foundation of this idea can be
traced back to the Coase theorem.  In his seminal, The Problem of Social
Cost, Roland Coase demonstrated that in a world without transaction
costs, contracts would lead to allocative efficiency irrespective of the
law.325  Subsequent law and economics writers have pushed Coase’s
core insight further and argued for the primacy of contracts (or mar-
kets) as the policy instrument of choice as long as transaction costs are
not prohibitive.326  Several contract theorists have even called for the
adoption of penalty defaults—i.e., statutory gap-fillers that diverge the
arrangements the parties would have selected for themselves had they
contracted—in order to encourage parties to reach ex ante agree-
ments that determine their rights and duties vis-a`-vis one another.327
In keeping with this approach, one may argue that because our frame-
work would allow courts to reach efficient and equitable results, ex
post, it would undermine the incentive of creators to determine their
rights ex ante.
Our first response to this argument is to remind our readers that
nothing in our proposal denies creators the opportunity to determine
their respective rights contractually.  Indeed, as we emphasized,328
courts should defer to the contractual arrangements reached by the
parties and will only be able to use our framework when there is no
agreement among the relevant parties.  Second, contracts can only be
relied upon to achieve an efficient allocation of resources when trans-
action costs are sufficiently low.329  In the case at hand, this condition
does not obtain: transaction costs are often high.  To begin with, col-
laborative works are often created by multiple parties.  Multiparty
agreements typically involve higher coordination costs and as the
number of parties grows, so does the likelihood of an impasse.  More-
over, contributors to collaborative works are often not familiar with
the intricacies of copyright law and find it prohibitively costly to learn
the doctrinal details.  As Professor Robert Ellickson famously estab-
lished,330 when the cost of learning is high, members of various com-
325 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–17 (1960).
326 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 93 (6th ed. 2012); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90–93
(1991); William Barnett II et al., The Paradox of Coase as a Defender of Free Markets, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 1075, 1078 (2005).
327 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 624 (1990).
328 Supra Part II.C.
329 Elrik G. Furubotn, General Equilibrium Models, Transaction Costs, and the Concept of
Efficient Allocation in a Capitalist Economy, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 662,
683–84 (1991).
330 Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 685–86 (1986).
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munities tend to fall back on social norms and shared
understandings.331  A similar dynamic can be discerned in various cre-
ative communities332 where creative processes are governed by what
Ellickson calls a “live and let live” norm.333  In the realm of copyright
law, ignorance of the law runs even deeper than in other fields as
rights in chattels are distinct from the rights in the expressive content
embedded in them.334  For example, when a corporation pays an in-
dependent programmer to upgrade a software application for it, the
corporation will typically receive only a license to use the upgraded
version.335  In the absence of an explicit transfer of rights in a written
document, the copyright in the new code will remain the property of
the programmer even though the corporation paid the programmer
for her labor.336  Because they fail to appreciate the nuances of copy-
right law,337 many creators simply do not know how to craft agree-
ments that govern the production of copyrighted content.
Furthermore, contracts are of limited utility when the subject of
the agreement is nonobservable.  As Professor Yochai Benkler338 and
others339 have noted, creative input is a classic example.340  Since crea-
tive effort is nonobservable to other parties, it is difficult to draft a
contract that would determine the reward of the creator.341  Where
the reward is determined in advance, creators have an incentive to
shirk.342  Hence, ex ante contracting regarding rights in expressive
content presents a real challenge to the contracting parties and typi-
cally involves high transaction costs.343
For all these reasons, private ordering of the regulation of rights
in copyrighted content will almost certainly be incomplete.  That said,
we are cognizant of the fact that the adoption of our proposal would
affect ex ante contracting.  Empowering courts to determine the
331 Id.
332 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANS-
FORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 115–16 (2006).
333 Ellickson, supra note 330, at 682. R
334 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Alienability and Copyright Law, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 161, 170–73 (Helena R. Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds.,
2013).
335 Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License?  Contracting Around Statutory
Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 100–02 (2006).
336 Id. at 104–07.
337 Stella Brown, Note, It Takes a Village to Make a Difference: Continuing the Spirit of Copy-
right, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 129, 147 (2014).
338 Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-Based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J.
POL. PHIL. 394, 402–03 (2006).
339 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1701–02. R
340 Benkler & Nissenbaum, supra note 338, at 402–03; Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at R
1701–02.
341 Casey & Sawicki, supra note 3, at 1701–02. R
342 Id. at 1700 n.64.
343 Id. at 1689, 1695.
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rights of the parties, ex post, would invariably affect bargaining posi-
tions of the relevant parties vis-a`-vis one another and therefore their
incentives to contract.344  Specifically, contributors who believe they
get greater rights in court, under our proposed system, would likely be
more reluctant to determine their rights contractually.  Contrariwise,
contributors who believe they would do better at the negotiation table
would try harder to settle the allocation of rights contractually and
avoid litigation.  But all this is true only of the actors who go through
the trouble of educating themselves about the law.  The behavior of
contributors who don’t know the law and find it prohibitively expen-
sive to educate themselves about it will not modify their behavior.
Their ex ante behavior will not be affected by our proposal.
At the end of the day, then, we recognize that the implementa-
tion of our proposal will have an effect on ex ante contracting, but it is
difficult to say, in the abstract, whether it would lead to more or less
contracting and, in any case, we are of the view that the ex post gains
in terms of stronger incentives to create, improved use of collabora-
tive works, and reduction in administrative costs would outweigh the
losses from a possible marginal drop in ex ante contracting.
B. Comparative Merit
A different objection to our proposal targets the core mission we
assign the courts, namely, the need to assess the relative contribution
of the parties to the productive output.  One might argue that courts
are ill equipped to determine the respective contributions of the par-
ties and therefore would not be able to decide with sufficient accuracy
their ownership stakes.  We believe that this objection is overblown
and therefore should not bar the implementation of our proposal.
The comparative fault revolution in tort law345 proves that courts can
adequately determine contributions to adverse outcomes.  There is no
a fortiori reason to think that courts would do worse in determining
contributions to positive outcomes.
This point warrants elaboration.  For many centuries the tort sys-
tem had a binary design.346  Actors were either fully liable for harm
they inflicted on others or fully relieved of responsibility.347  A finding
of no responsibility implied that the loss lied where it fell, or, in other
words, that it was borne by the victim.348  Historically, the option of
apportioning responsibility between the injurer and the victim was not
344 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571
(1992).
345 Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault
in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 294 (1994).
346 Id. at 284–86.
347 Id.
348 Id.
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available to courts.349  Over time, however, policymakers introduced
comparative fault into the tort system.350  Apportioning the blame
among the parties was thought to lead to more equitable results, ex
post,351 without harming ex ante incentives to take care.352  Although
determining the blame of each party can prove tricky at times, com-
parative fault has become part and parcel of the modern law of tort
and no one seriously calls for its abolition.353
The successful implementation of comparative fault is a good
omen for our proposal.  In the typical case, courts will find the task of
determining parties’ contributions to expressive products easier than
determining their comparative fault.  Unlike accidents or behaviors
that lead to adverse results, creative processes are usually well docu-
mented.  This is so for several reasons.  First, when parties engage in
harmful activities that are likely to harm others they have an incentive
to destroy evidence that implicates them in such behavior.354  By con-
trast, when parties produce socially desirable results, as they do when
they create works of authorship, they often may want to make their
contribution known, so they can receive the social recognition they
deserve.355  Second, as far as creative processes are concerned, the
documentation often arises automatically, thanks to modern technol-
ogy that frequently documents and saves each incremental contribu-
tion to the creative process.356  Accordingly, authors have a built-in
incentive to document their artistic achievements in a stable and dura-
ble fashion—characteristically, via the creation of copies of their con-
tributions to later be distributed to the public.  Third, copyright law
itself requires authors to fix their works in a tangible medium in order
for them to receive copyright protection.357  Hence there is ample rea-
son to believe that courts would be able to rely on a much better evi-
dentiary basis when determining ownership shares in collaborative
work than when apportioning responsibility for harm in tort cases.
349 Id. at 293.
350 Id. at 294.
351 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 375,
379–82 (1987).
352 Id. at 382–83.
353 Davis, supra note 345, at 351–52. R
354 John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1651
(2010).
355 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 700 (noting that authors have varied, R
“heterogeneous interests,” including at times just wanting “the credit”).
356 See, e.g., Declaration of W. Curtis Preston at 6–7, PB&J Software, LLC v. Code 42
Software, Inc., No. 09-CV-00206, 2011 WL 8333129 (D. Minn. Sept. 29, 2011) (noting that
modern software makes documentation of successive drafts much easier: in “[m]odern
backup systems . . .  there are multiple versions of a file, each non-identical ver-
sion . . .  backed-up in its entirety as a separate file,” whereas in the past only one final file
would be saved).
357 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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Moreover, it bears emphasis that courts are already assessing com-
parative merit (or contributions) in other legal domains.  For exam-
ple, in cases of dissolution of marriage, a large group of states,
including New York and Florida, follows an equitable distribution
model that requires courts to determine, inter alia, the respective con-
tributions of each of the spouses to the acquisition of marital prop-
erty.358  This determination is far more complex than the one we
expect courts to perform in establishing copyright trusts, as there are
no clear definitions as to what counts as a contribution to married life.
Yet, equitable distribution systems have been at work for several de-
cades.359  Another domain in which courts are required to compare
contributions is that of employee inventions.  The laws of several
countries empower courts to allocate rights to inventions developed in
the workplace based on the relative contributions of the employee
and the employer to the patented product or process.360  Obviously
this example is very close to the kinds of tasks courts would have to
undertake to allocate copyright trust rights.
C. Doctrine
A third potential objection to our proposal stems from a more
technical problem.  Copyright trusts are not currently employed by
the courts.  It might be argued that courts cannot begin creating copy-
right trusts without new statutory authority.
Of course, we have no objection to lawmakers amending the Cop-
yright Act in order to adopt copyright trusts explicitly within the stat-
ute.  At the same time, we contend that courts may already adopt our
proposal without any further statutory authority.  As we noted,361 the
actual statutory language in the Copyright Act concerning joint au-
thorships is quite limited.  The courts, rather than Congress, decided
to adopt the model of tenancy in common for all joint authorships.362
No statute requires using the model in all cases.  Likewise, it is the
courts, rather than Congress, that decided how to interpret the term
“author.”363  Case law, not statutory language, imposed the “master
358 Carmen Valle Patel, Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in Equita-
ble Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 557 (1983).
359 Elizabeth A. Cheadle, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital
Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269, 1279 (1981).
360 Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 4–6 (1999); see also Vai Io Lo, Employee Inventions and Works for Hire in Japan: A
Comparative Study Against the U.S., Chinese, and German Systems, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
279 (2002) (discussing several nation-state examples of these court-empowerment laws).
361 Supra Part I.A.1.b.
362 See Kwall, supra note 173, at 57 (discussing how, like general property, copyright law R
tenancy in common doctrine stemmed from judge-made law).
363 See generally id. at 57–59 (discussing the predominant role of courts given that the
1976 Copyright Act does not specify the meaning of “an author”).
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mind” requirement on authorship.364  Judicial action to create a new
model of shared ownership among collaborating authors—and an at-
tendant expanded understanding of the meaning of authorship for
purposes of earning a beneficial share of a copyright trust—falls
within the authority that courts already exercise.
Indeed, there are a number of cases indicating that our proposed
remedy is already within the scope of judicial powers.  Perhaps the
outstanding example is provided by Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,365 where the
court dealt with a divorcing spouse’s claim to a share of ownership in
a copyrighted work.  The court awarded the nonauthor spouse “an
undivided one-half interest in the net economic benefits generated by
or resulting from copyrighted works,” while awarding the author
spouse “continued entitlement to the exclusive control and manage-
ment” of the works.366  Although the court based its decision on Loui-
siana community property law rather than general copyright law, it
clearly found the division of ownership interests between a legal and
beneficial owner to be within the scope of judicial powers permitted
by the Copyright Act.
Additionally, as we have noted, the Copyright Act already recog-
nizes a concept of “beneficial ownership,” albeit for the limited pur-
pose of establishing standing to sue.367  In short, there is little reason
to believe that our proposal is beyond judicial powers under the law.
D. An Incomplete Remedy
A final objection relates to the utility of our proposed doctrine.
Specifically, it might be argued that there may be cases where our
doctrine does not help resolve the tensions among collaborators.  The
recent case of Garcia v. Google, Inc.368 may best illustrate the objection.
In Garcia, the plaintiff, an actress named Cindy Lee Garcia, sought to
enjoin the distribution of a controversial movie about the life of
Muhammad, the founder of Islam, on the grounds that she did not
consent to the inclusion of the relatively small part in which she ap-
peared in the film.369  She asserted—and the court vindicated her
claim—that she owned a separate copyright in her performance that
allowed her to block any showings of the film that included her per-
formance.370  Garcia’s motivation was not profit.  She had received
death threats in relation to her performance in the film.371  In any
364 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).
365 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000).
366 Id. at 443.
367 Supra Part II.C.
368 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g on banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
369 Id. at 932.
370 Id. at 935.
371 Id. at 932.
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event, the film was apparently intended for limited distribution
through YouTube and would certainly never turn a profit.372  Thus, it
is evident that Garcia’s interests in blocking use of her performance in
the film could never be vindicated through a copyright trust.
We readily acknowledge that our proposed doctrine cannot pro-
vide a universal remedy for all potential disputes among collaborators
regarding copyrighted works.  It is for this reason that we propose that
the copyright trust supplement, rather than replace, existing legal
remedies.  The copyright trust can resolve the adverse effects created
by the unity of ownership and control when there are many contribu-
tors to a single work of authorship.  The copyright trust cannot univer-
sally resolve every potential point of contention among collaborators.
At the same time, it is important not to exaggerate the impor-
tance of outlying cases like Garcia.  In most cases, a copyright trust can
provide a good resolution of collaborator disputes. Garcia is a highly
unusual case; it is the exception that proves the rule.  The facts of
Garcia reveal a truly anomalous situation where copyright law ended
up providing a legal remedy for a dispute that primarily concerned
speech issues unrelated to the core of copyright.
The film in controversy in Garcia, entitled The Innocence of Mus-
lims, was not one intended for mass distribution or profit. The Inno-
cence of Muslims was intended to be a highly inflammatory depiction of
Muhammad that would cast the religion of Islam in an uncomplimen-
tary light.373  There is little doubt that the film’s producer intended to
create great offense and that he expected a strong negative reaction
to his film.  Indeed, the film’s producer systematically misinformed
people about the film, apparently in order to avoid being personally
tied to the backlash he was certain would ensue.374  The producer lied
to actors and other participants about the nature of the film; he as-
sured them it was a “desert adventure” and he had them read dialogue
for the “adventure” that he subsequently overdubbed.375  The pro-
ducer lied about his identity to the media, attempting to mislead the
372 See Aly Weisman, The Insulting, Anti-Muslim, Low-Budget Film that Provoked the Attacks
on American Embassies, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/heres-the-low-budget-american-film-that-was-being-protested-
during-the-libya-attacks-2012-9 (discussing many aspects of the film, including its inability,
and indeed lack of an intention, to raise money for profit).
373 Peter Rudegeair, I Have No Regrets for Portraying Mohammad as a Womanizer and
Pedophile: Innocence of Muslims Filmmaker, NAT’L POST (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://
news.nationalpost.com/2012/11/26/i-have-no-regrets-for-portraying-mohammad-as-a-
womanizer-and-pedophile-innocence-of-muslims-filmmaker/.
374 Id.
375 Innocence of Muslims: How Bad?  How Cheap?  How Wrong?, WEEK (last updated Sept.
14, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://www.theweek.co.uk/middle-east/islam-film-row/49036/inno-
cence-muslims-how-bad-how-cheap-how-wrong.
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public into believing the film had come from another source.376
Unsurprisingly, the film did produce a backlash.  The film prompted
protests, many violent, in a number of Muslim countries.377  The
White House denounced the film,378 and the film’s producer was soon
arrested on the grounds that some aspects of his involvement violated
an earlier parole agreement.379  Several people associated with the
film were threatened with violence or death for the “negative por-
trayal of the Prophet.”380
There are numerous aspects of the film that raise difficult legal
questions.  What bounds may the state place on speech that gravely
insults religious figures?  May the state take into account the threat of
violence by adherents to the religion in defining those bounds?
Should private individuals have the right to curtail the speech of
others where third parties view the speech as motivation for acts of
violence?  How should legal rights regarding such speech be altered
in the face of apparent fraud by someone who has organized the
speech of others?  The answers to these questions are not obvious.
It should be noted, however, that none of these questions lie at
the core of copyright, which is a body of law that protects legal rights
in creative works in order to create pecuniary incentives for crea-
tion.381  Although Cindy Lee Garcia used the law of copyright to pro-
tect herself, she sought to vindicate interests that are rarely implicated
in copyright disputes.  Indeed, the criticism382 that has been leveled
against the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Garcia has
seemingly proved, once again, that hard cases make bad law.  The de-
cision in Garcia was apparently motivated by the larger concerns raised
by the film, but the ruling cannot easily be reconciled with the extant
law of copyright.383  For the ordinary copyright case, copyright trusts
376 Id.
377 Liz Goodwin, ‘Innocence of Muslims’: The Film That May Have Sparked U.S. Embassy
Protests, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-look-
out/innocence-muslims-film-sparked-deadly-u-embassy-attacks-142118931.html.
378 Id.
379 Brooks Barnes, Man Behind Anti-Islam Video Gets Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2012, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/maker-of-anti-islam-
video-gets-prison-term.html.
380 Court Orders Anti-Muslim Film Offline, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 27, 2014, 1:39 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/court-orders-takedownofantimuslim
video.html.
381 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1745 (2012) (asserting that this pecuniary reward for creativity is the very reason for
copyright at all).
382 See Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, 67 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 37, 38 (2014); Jesse Woo, Garcia v. Google: Copyright Is Not Always the An-
swer, WASH. LAW. FOR ARTS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2014), http://thewla.org/garcia-v-google-copy
right-is-not-always-the-answer/ (providing another example of criticism).
383 Woo, supra note 382. R
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should remain a valuable option for courts and a tool that reduces
disputes.
CONCLUSION
As expressive works become increasingly collaborative in nature,
the problem of allocating rights to a commonly produced work has
become paramount.  We showed that the existing doctrines employed
by copyright law to address this challenge are inadequate for the task.
In its current form, copyright law simply does not provide the courts
with the tools they need to resolve disputes concerning right alloca-
tion and management in collaborative expressive works.  Some of the
doctrines are too coarse, while others are too vague and malleable.  As
we demonstrated, the lack of a precise legal mechanism has an ad-
verse effect on the production and use of collaborative works.  Fur-
thermore, it consumes judicial resources that could have been put to
more productive uses.
In response to these problems, we developed a new ownership
model that is uniquely designed to address collaborative creative
works, termed “copyright trusts.”  In our model, courts, when dealing
with collaborative works, would have the option of appointing one of
the contributors as an “owner-trustee,” who would have managerial
powers, and the other contributors as “owner-beneficiaries,” who
would be entitled to a predetermined share of the proceeds.  To pre-
vent abuse of power by the owner-trustee, she would owe a fiduciary
duty to the owner-beneficiaries.  The proposed ownership structure
would concentrate all decision-making powers in the hands of a single
owner (the owner-trustee), whom the court considers best suited for
the task.  At the same time, it would allow all other contributors (the
owner-beneficiaries) to receive financial remuneration for their labor.
Importantly, under our system the court will have the power to give
owner-beneficiaries different ownership stakes commensurate with
their contribution to the creative enterprise.  Our model is therefore
capable of producing more efficient and more equitable outcomes
than current law.
Importantly, we do not wish to abrogate existing copyright doc-
trine and replace it with our proposal.  Quite the contrary, our goal is
to add another tool to the toolkit of the courts and allow courts to use
it in appropriate cases.  Analytically, ownership and control are two
distinct concepts.  Yet, copyright law, in its current form, has elided
the two, vesting in copyright owners all the prerogatives of control.
Corporate law, by contrast, has kept the two separate.  It is time that
copyright law departed from the old paradigm to find inspiration in
other legal domains.
